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Summary 
1. What is the policy problem that gives rise to this study? 
The problem that has originated this research is to identify aspects of this REDD strategy that 
may provide an assessment of whether this fiscal policy is either efficient, effective or both. 
The Ecological ICMS is a Brazilian environmental policy implemented in a state level. Thus, 
the financial outcome of this program relies within the limitations of the state budget in 
order to earmark payments to compensate for environmental restrictions. The higher is the 
cost of land, the bigger is the challenge to compensate the municipalities for their services. 
Therefore, the central concern of the research is to determine whether we can see a welfare 
gain in those communities recieveing ICMS-E versus municipalities not recieving ICMS-E.  The 
evidences of welfare improvement can be expressed in various forms such as: maintenance 
of land coverage, reduction of forest degradation, more intact original vegetation, increment 
of local revenue, increased input and output of public spending that counter-weights forest 
depletion, improvement of social services and correlated factors, external effects that 
reward the effort of protecting the local biodiversity, evidences of improvement in the social 
indicators, etc. As an example, the literature has discussed that better educated population, 
in regions with higher GDP per capta, tend to protect more the environment. Thus, within 
this context, it’s necessary to understand the performance of the municipal schools, where 
the local budget is accountable for both the receipt and spending of the fiscal transfer. This 
is a central premise as we shall deal with public investment as to the 141 municipalities to be 
studied. Obliviously, the spatial distribution of resources is an important factor; making one 
region poorer, as a result of another become wealthier, due to  reallocation of a fixed 
budget, possibly implies in a non-beneficial offsetting; an outcome that may even push 
regional inequality further, which is considered a federal challenge in Brazil. Closing access to 
public areas needs, therefore, to be considered as an investment.  
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2.What are the specific research questions in this regard?  
a) History of ICMS-E impacts  
(i) What have been the measurable conservation effects of ICMS-E in Mato Grosso as 
compared to Paraná? (ii) Have areas of preservation increased with the incentives? (iii) Has 
the income generated with ICMS-E decreased as new municipalities joined the programme? 
b) Legal basis for ICMS-E  
(iv) What is the legislation regulating ICMS-E implementation by the state at local level in 
Mato Grosso and Paraná? 
c) Opportunity costs and Welfare  
(v) Are the discrepancies in the opportunity cost of land use (qualitative discussion) a 
significant factor on the relative success of ICMS-E at the municipality level? (vi) Has the 
ICMS-E improved the welfare in Mato Grosso? (vii) Have the ICMS-E payments impacted any 
municipality's quality of municipal educational provision (in this study, this is measured by 
the Prova Brasil index)? (viii) Is there any findings suggesting that the Ecological ICMS an 
efficient fiscal policy? 
 
3.How does answering the questions contribute to the existing literature? 
The findings of this thesis are expected to add more information around the economic 
strength of this ecological fiscal transfers in the Mato Grosso state. Previous research has 
criticized the effectiveness of the ecological ICMS. Nevertheless, we should never dismiss 
that the core contribution of the program itself is to protect local biodiversity through 
impediment of public entrance to those protected areas. Moreover, this research 
contributes to fill the information gaps found in the mosaic of the federal policy as to its 
financial outcomes; not only in quantitative terms but also in qualitative terms. Because the 
longest inter-temporal data (both as to Paraná, our benchmark state, and as to Mato 
Grosso) are relatively recent (between 10 to 20 years), much of the initial researches on the 
topic, specially beyond Paraná, had to deal with short time trajectories, lack of data, regional 
constrains and peculiarities and, in some cases, analysis based on empirical expectations.  
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4.What are the testable hypotheses? 
This investigation, since the beginning, has worked with the hypothesis that the overall 
outcomes of the policy are indeed positive such as follows: 
H1: The Ecological ICMS-E contributes to increase welfare levels in the communities that 
have joined the strategy. 
H2: The fiscal transfer policy is not a “Jogo de Soma Zero” (Zero-Sum-Game), that is, the 
more participants enter the membership, less payment amounts are transferred to each 
municipality. 
H3: The policy has a positive effect on the financing of public municipal schools as a concrete 
improvement of public service in a local level. 
H4: The ICMS-E increased the number and the area of Conservation Unities as well as 
keeping local biodiversity intact by reducing deforestation levels.   
H5: Regional economic growth has a positive impact on the financial results of the ICMS-E. 
 
5.How is the hypotheses/ methodology tested? 
The hypothesis above can be tested through quantitative and qualitative analysis. The 
qualitative analysis attempts to interpret the differences and analogies between the policy 
model in Paraná, where a “quality factor” has been implemented, and in Mato Grosso, 
where the conservation coefficient is established through the type and importance of the 
protected unities and their areas. This analysis is expected to provide insights about the 
commitment and obligations of the local municipalities. Furthermore, the quantitative 
analysis attempts to summarize and establish the relationship of significant statistical 
outcomes (i.g: increase of protected areas, evidences of efficient distributional impact, etc.). 
This is method is tested for hypothesis H1 and H2.  
Hypothesis H4 and H5 are tested by the covariance of the factors disclosed with the data and 
are analyzed as to their trajectories, performances and correlations.  
In addition, for hypothesis testing H3, an estimative OLS model, suggested in previous 
investigations, is tested in order to depict the dependence of influential determinants such 
as ICMS-E transfers, added-value tax revenue, local education improvement, etc. 
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6. What data has been collect to test the hypothesis?  
Data has been collected from different institutional sources. There are mainly four types of 
raw data that have also contributed with further calculations: (i) The social-economic 
indicators have been acquired from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, IBGE 
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) and the Brazilian Institute of Applied 
Economics Research, IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada). (ii) The statistics on 
deforestation is provided by the National Institute of Spatial Research, INPE (Instituto 
Nacional de Pesquisa Espacial) and available at the Mato Grosso’s Department of 
Environement, SEMA-MT. (iii) The data as to the state level revenue and transfers paid to 
the municipalities is provided by Mato Grosso and Paraná State Departments of Finance and 
Environment, SEMA-MT, SEFAZ-MT, SEMA-PA and SEFAZ PA. (iv) The indicators of municipal 
school performances (Prova Brasil) has been provided by the Brazilian Ministry of Education 
and Culture, MEC (Ministério da Educacão e Cultura). Deforestation rates had to be manually 
calculated as  secondary data. All statistics and data sets are publicly accessible at the 
websites of the institutions listed above and referred at the end of the study. 
 
7. Results: Where have the hypotheses rejected with statistical significance?  
Several empirical studies have rejected the hypothesis that the entry of new members could 
keep the level of municipal revenues at least constant. This finding has been clearly rejected 
in this study. 
The municipal area is an important factor both in the ICMS-E revenue as well as in levels of 
absolute deforestation. But most importantly, the deforestation rate is lower in 
municipalities participating in the PES where their average territorial size is bigger. It means 
that deforestation is not necessarily a consequence of forest areas. 
GDP per capta is, in average, lower in municipalities where deforestation is higher. This is 
also confirmed when we verify this trend by comparing the municipalities not participating 
in the program with the group of municipalities that are members. Under the limited scope 
of this study, this trend leads to an inefficient outcome. The poorer municipalities are also 
the ones loosing local biodiversity in a faster rate. Not to mention that they have their 
revenue share reduced once the state’s budget has to compensate the municipalities that 
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have implemented the policy. Finally, the study also rejects the hypothesis that relative high 
economic activity is necessarily correlated with high levels of forest depletion. 
 
8. What findings in the literature have been confirmed or rejected? 
This study has confirmed positive outcomes found in previous investigations such as increase 
in the number and surface of Conservation Unities; Strong incentive for creation of 
municipal protected areas; Positive impact on municipal finances; Introduction of the 
environmental agenda in small towns. The Thesis rejects the finding that the benefit 
(payments) decreases as new entrants join the program. Higher GDP per capta as a driver of 
deforestation also rejects previous literature postulations. 
 
9. What is the policy relevance of the findings? 
The findings in this Thesis are expected to contribute with the Ecological ICMS’s policy 
assessment in Mato Grosso in various ways. The work has focused on finding both 
quantifiable and qualitative arguments to support the performance of this REDD strategy in 
a region with strong biodiversity degradation due to industrial and agricultural stress. The 
results of this study respond to the questions that other investigations have not attacked in 
Mato Grosso, such as inter-temporal analysis of the revenue combined with deforestation 
outcomes and the significance of welfare improvements. In other words, the analysis was 
based on the question of whether it was worth to implement this mechanism in Mato 
Grosso as to its environmental, financial and social benefits.  
 
10. What are the research questions for the future that come out of this study? 
(i) Has the extra public financing, in local level, benefited the communities in terms of 
investment in environmental services? 
(ii) How does the ICMS-E cause imbalances in the fiscal revenue distribution? 
(iii) Have public services (e.g. healthcare, sanitation, water supply, conservation of protected 
areas, etc.), in a local level, improved with the ICMS-E implementation? 
(iv) What’s the relationship between ICMS-E and improvement of social indicators in the 
communities joining the program? 
(v) How much of the local budgets are earmarked back into the local environmental policies? 
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Introduction 
 
Public Policies, the Effects of Forest Depletion and Climate Change: the big picture1 
The search for specific answers around the correlations of public policies and their economic 
outcomes has become increasingly important to the preservation, or optimal use, of 
numerous natural resources and local biodiversity. Whereas my investigation will treat very 
restricted questions related to the implementation of the ICMS-E (an instrument for fiscal 
revenue transfer in Brazil)2, I should not dismiss the three conceptual pillars that sustain the 
basis for this study: The Economics of Natural Resources and Welfare, the Science of Climate 
Change and Sustainable Development. Thus, the grounds that have motivated me to analyze 
the attributes of Payments for Ecological Services3, and their implications, are intrinsically 
connected and/or interdependent of those scientific research lines mentioned above.  
Although the challenges regarding the protection of local biodiversity have become 
dramatically notorious over the past two decades, we should observe that, within this 
context, Resource Economics have made significant progresses over the past century. One of 
the objectives in this examination is to discuss few assumptions related to the specific 
features of an innovative payment mechanism for ecological benefits (ICMS-Ecológico) 
without neglecting some relevant postulations within Environmental and Resource 
Economics (HOTELLING, 1932; ASHEIM, 1994; BURROUGHS, 2007; POLICYMIX, 2009; 
ANGELSEN, 2009). 
  
                                                          
1
 Figure 14 illustrates some of the components of a multi-tiered policy framework. 
2
 See more detailed definition on section 2.1, page 17. 
3
 PES - Payments for Environmental Services (or Benefits), in short, is the practice of offering incentives to 
landowners (public of private) in exchange for managing their land to provide some sort of ecological service. 
These programs promote the conservation of natural resources in the marketplace.  
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In order to move further, it is essential to comprehend the international context and point in 
time at which my reasoning takes place. This investigation, however, needs to be dared to 
ponder the discussions around the effectiveness of local environmental economic policies 
that fall into a much broader framework. The challenges around biodiversity conservation 
and its impact on the worldwide climate change are likewise questions about economic 
development (VICTOR, 2008). Could economic policies be really influential as to the global 
ecological balance? For the past decades, scientists, politicians and civil society’s 
representatives have engaged in numerous debates aimed to seek answers for the global 
challenges raised with the systematic alterations of the climate patterns and their effects. 
Conclusions vary absolutely from country to country, within the sciences and among publicly 
empowered leaderships. In particular, forests impact the climate mainly in four important 
ways: Estimates show that they are responsible for one-sixth of the global carbon emissions 
while being depleted, overexploited or degraded. Land coverage and forest burning respond 
considerably to changes in temperature. They are source of wood fuels which is a positive 
substitution for fossil fuels, as long as they are output generated from sustainable 
production. And last but not least, forests can be used to absorb one-tenth of global carbon 
emissions (predictions for the next 50 years) into their bio-systems as well as into their soil. 
Due to their storage capacity, this process can even perpetuate (FAO, 2012).  The discussion 
about the need to control the rise of temperatures around the world is not only intricate 
from the perspective of how changes take place; it is also complex from the perspective of 
achieving binding cross-nation solutions to address the consequences of global warming, 
especially when it concerns sovereignty, development and the economic growth of nations 
(BARRETT, 2008; FREITAS, 2011). Burroughs (2009) postulates that the only way to address 
the challenges ahead is through a multidisciplinary approach that embodies the 
contributions of distinct sciences such as sociology, physics, mathematics, economics, 
politics, biology, etc. Having affirmed that, Arrow (2007) argues, further on, that the factual 
truth is that the climate has always changed throughout the times. This imposes an extra 
difficulty; how to interpret the phenomena without overestimating the threats to the 
sustainable balance of the numerous ecosystems. If these forecasts are overestimated, their 
related policies could lead to a disorganization of social structures within the various realities  
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of the different regions in the world. Furthermore, much of the current aggregated impact 
on the climate is indeed a result of the human activities and their need to consume. 
According to Arrow (2007) on the Stern Report4, economics and climate change are 
interconnected studies as matter of fact (ARROW, 2007; FREITAS, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
The activities of the Earth’s climate are driven by a varied range of elements that are 
interlaced in a complex web of physical developments. Furthermore, Burroughs (2009) 
advocates that sciences need to adjust themselves into a much broader picture and not just 
focus the discussion in that they perceive as a fundamental debate. We are all frequently 
guided by dramatic information on how the climate is changing. Because the information 
sources are provided by institutions around the globe, with some imprecise error margin, 
the first logical step to take would be to understand the distinction between the variability 
of climate and the change of climate. It is recognized that, within the theories of weather 
and climate, changes in the climate represent shifts in the meteorological schedules; and 
they can keep their dynamics for years (BURROUGHS, 2009; FREITAS, 2011). Those effects 
may involve as few as just a single indicator such as temperature or rainfall. On the other 
hand, they could also be influenced by shifts in weather conditions that may lead to changes 
in temperature, moisture, clouds and winding conditions. Due to the connection with global 
weather patterns, these changes can result in compensating shifts in different parts of the 
world. So, it is expected that they can be linked to a warming or cooling movement of the 
world climate. However, when we look into the consequences of the variations in climate 
                                                          
4 Stern Report: The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change is a British governmental document 
written by the economist Nicholas Stern that addresses the effects of climate change on the world economy. 
The report was issued on 30 October 2006. Stern is the chair of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate 
Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics.  
 
“Critics of the Stern Report don’t think serious action to limit carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is 
justified because there remains substantial uncertainty about the extent of the costs of global 
climate change and because these costs will be incurred far in the future. They think that Stern 
improperly fails to discount for either uncertainty or futurity. I agree that both futurity and 
uncertainty require significant discounting. However, even with that, I believe the fundamental 
conclusion of Stern is justified: we are much better off to act to reduce CO2 emissions 
substantially than to suffer and risk the consequences of failing to meet this challenge. As I 
explain here, this conclusion holds true even if, unlike Stern, one heavily discounts the future.” 
(ARROW, 2007) 
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change, the regional outcomes are the ones that provide researchers with the most 
significant materials, if they are proven to be related to the issues of global warming. One 
aspect of the climate change is that everything in the system is connected. So, although 
processes may be separately analyzed, it is important to have a bird’s eye view of how facts 
interact and how they are linked (ARROW, 2007; BURROUGHS, 2009). In addition, this study 
examines the prospects of a financial compensation aimed to halter the loss of local 
biodiversity; a process that is even irreversible in some cases. Within this context, 
deforestation is considered doubly harmful. It does not only account towards the loss of 
biodiversity but as a factor for increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, through the 
reduction of aggregated photosynthesis. Some of the drivers of the loss of biodiversity 
include land conversion for economic use, exploitation of wild species, insertion of exotic 
species into new habitats, natural environment pollution and, redundantly, climate change 
itself. Their consequences have negative impact not only on the trends of the world’s 
climate, but, essentially, on the existence of life in its most elementary notion (PIMENTEL, 
1997) . As of January 2012, the world’s rate of deforestation was estimated around 25 
hectares per minute (CIFOR, 2012). Fertile soil is a crucial element of the world's biotas 
because all plant and animal species need either land or products that are cultivated in soil 
for their subsistence. More than 99% of the total worldwide human food supply is produced 
on land, whereas only 0.6% comes from oceans and other aquatic ecosystems (FAO, 2012; 
PIMENTEL, 1997). In spite of the soil preparation with mechanic mixing for agriculture 
purposes, soil formation on cropland is a gradual and long process.  But it is even slower 
when the soil is under natural forest and grassland. Pimentel et al. (1995) highlights that, 
under agricultural conditions, approximately 500 years is required to form 25 mm of soil, 
while under forest conditions, it takes around 1000 years to produce a similar amount of 
soil. Taking this concern into account, the Department of Environment of Mato Grosso 
(SEMA-MT) considers that an affirmative agenda that promotes the protection of 
biodiversity must contemplate the equilibrium of the ecosystems and restoration of 
degraded areas (SEMA-MT, 2011). The Mato Grosso state has registered 23 federal, 46 state 
and 33 municipal Conservation Unities (see figure 16). Although deforestation has decreased 
consistently in recent years, as a whole, understanding whether the ICMS-E is an effective 
economic policy remains an important debate (MAY, NETO, DENARDIN, & LOUREIRO, 2002).  
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1- Objectives  
 
ICMS-Ecológico as Payment for Ecological Services 
Several policies worldwide have tried to establish the balance between consumption of 
natural resources, whether they are legal or not, and the ideal practice of economic activities 
(Ring 2007). As a result, a number of industrialized countries have committed to contribute 
with payments for forest conservation since the UN’s meeting in Bali in 2007. Within this 
context, Payment for Environmental Services (PES) has been proposed as an effective 
complement to other regulatory conservation policies in the fight for forest protection (see 
e.g. records of Ring, 2007; May, 2002; POLICYMIX5, 2009). In spite of this, a number of 
scientific studies question the consistency and effectiveness of REDD6’s actions in jointly 
increasing forest protection and local livelihoods (see e.g. Börner et al., 2009).  
The objective of this study is to identify the efficiency and cost-effectiveness levels of a  
Payment for Ecological Services in Mato Grosso. Thus, we shall attempt to verify the 
reasoning behind two fundamental outcomes. First, it’s imperative to understand if the 
implemented mechanism complies with its core purpose, that is, to safeguard local 
biodiversity through creating and augmenting protected areas (MAY, NETO, DENARDIN, & 
LOUREIRO, 2002). Second, the study shall try to find evidences, as well, on the improvement 
of public services provided by the municipal administrations. Specifically, here, I consider the 
performance of students from the public municipal schools, in elementary years. Overall 
communities’ level of education is considered as an important social determinant in the 
                                                          
5
 According to the International Institute for Environment and Development, “the POLICYMIX Program aims to 
contribute to the EU's goals of reversing trends in biodiversity loss beyond 2010 through the use of cost-
effective and incentive-compatible economic instruments”. POLICYMIX focuses on the role of economic 
instruments in a mix of operational conservation policy instruments (NINA, 2011). 
6
 United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
in Developing Countries: UN-REDD Programme. For further reading, on this topic, see the journal article 
“Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and decentralized forest 
management.” (IRAWAN & TACCONI, 2009). 
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course of actions aimed to diminish deforestation rates (EHRHARDT-MARTINEZ, 1998; 
EWERS, 2005). The latter problem is the central question to be answered, if possible. 
Additionally, an effective and efficient public spending is expected to develop the welfare in 
communities granted with the compensation through rationally earmarked financial 
resources (MANDL, DIERX, & ILZKOVITZ, 2008). Our starting point is the distribution impact 
caused by a fiscal compensation aimed for environmental purposes, the ICMS-Ecológico. This 
incentive follows the principles of Fiscal Federalism; a dimension included in the public 
finances to support efficient allocations of resources and management of government’s 
functions to central, state and local administrations. The ICMS-Ecológico is a revenue bundle 
captured from the state’s largest source of taxation in Brazil, the ICMS (an added value tax). 
This added-value tax has been applied on goods and services since the Brazil’s 1988 
Constitution. At present times, it accounts for approximately 90% of the state tax revenues 
(RING I. , 2007). Considering it as a type of incentive, ICMS-E is an opportunity for 
municipalities to increase their share in tax revenue based on environmental performance 
indicators. The transfer of payments is made from the state budget to the municipalities, 
with spending primarily suiting the priorities of local public authorities thereafter. But, as a 
side effect, other public-private initiatives also stimulate the usage of directly and indirectly 
protected areas in a positive manner (RING, 2007). 
May & Neto (2002) study the implementation of ICMS-E in several states in the country. 
Their figures show that the outcomes appear to differ from state to state. This could be 
related to many distinct factors such as transparency, opportunity cost on the ground, legal 
framework, tools for measurement or even prioritization and urgency of communities’ 
representatives across legislative, executive and justice powers. Börner et al. (2009) 
observes that the implementation of a global policy that expects change in how local 
community actors perceive the value of original vegetation is a great challenge. 
Furthermore, this only makes sense when sustainable development is kept as goal (Börner et 
al., 2009). Looking at the Amazon Forest, it is clear that additional incentives for areas highly 
protected make a lot less sense than it does for areas where forest is at risk. This logic 
follows the concept of the opportunity cost of land usage. The more deforestation is 
avoided, higher is the cost in the form of displaced economic activities. Besides that, it also 
implies that much of PES (Payment for Ecological Services) will be concentrated in the hands 
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of large landowners because they are the ones harming more the forest (Börner et al., 
2009). The research project will try to observe the ability of the state to implement legal 
framework of ICMS-E and to earmark the spending of the revenue generated on reducing 
deforestation. 
The research will be based on the comparison of how two different states have 
implemented the ICMS-E as a response to forest degradation and in promotion of rational 
land use. One of the reasons for choosing this strategy is connected to the need of 
establishing a link among the various levels of political implications (e.g. MAY & NETO, 2002). 
The public decisions regarding quality of the investments and the jurisdiction established in 
Paraná and Mato Grosso are largely autonomous from federal policies. A comparative 
analysis here will not only attempt to disclose relevant data about public finance and trends. 
It shall also help understand what encourages, or prevents, municipalities as to increasing 
their conservation unities and others to become eligible to access the revenue generated 
with tax transfers in Mato Grosso state. 
Paraná, the first state to implement this compensation for municipalities (State Law No. 
59/1991), will be used as a benchmark. This preference is justified by the fact that Paraná 
has implemented qualitative and quantitative measurements to determine the allocation 
criteria for its municipalities (MAY & NETO, 2002). In that state, the municipality’s right to 
revenue transfers follows the performance obtained by an environmental index. The CCB 
(Biodiversity Conservation Coefficient)7 calculates the amount of physical quality (this can 
mean areas being recuperated) and the protected surface area of the CUs (Conservation 
Unities)8. This process is controlled by the Paraná Environmental Institute (IAP, Instituto 
Ambiental do Paraná). May & Neto (2002) affirm that these criteria can stimulate the CCB to 
consider improvements in the qualitative aspect of the CUs and their interactions with the 
communities around them. We will use Paraná’s experiences as a point of reference for 
Mato Grosso‘s implementation of ICMS-E. The results are expected to contribute to the 
illustration of the “policy mosaic” of Brazilian state and federal level conservation policies.  
                                                          
7
 The Biodiversity Conservation Coefficient is a formula that measures the percentages of revenue defined for 
each municipality, so the distribution of the Ecological ICMS (PES Policy) is simplified and standardized.  
8
 Conservation Unities are usually rural areas with relevant and/or concentrated levels of biodiversity. Further 
explanation about this term and official classifications on section 2.2, page 18. 
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The M.Sc. empirical analysis concentrates in the characteristics of the program in the State 
of Mato Grosso, Brazil. The state makes part of a region called Legal Amazon and 
concentrates one of the highest biodiversity levels per hectare in the world (POLICYMIX, 
2009). For the last two decades, Mato Grosso has also become a major producer of crops 
and other agriculture activities, leading to rapid deforestation rates and frustrating 
conservation actions (Andrade and May, 2002).  
Although the study will concentrate on the economical features of the ICMS-Ecológico (see 
Grieg-gran, 2000), the final goal of this research proposal is to determine whether allocation 
of fiscal resources is capable of improving sustainability at a regional level. Thus, a more 
complete analysis of the reality in the region would be intuitively more accurate if it 
considers a multi-dimensional approach, including cost, conservation effectiveness and 
distributional impact factors as to the implementation of ICMS-E.  
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2- Literature Review 
 
In this section, I shall attempt to shed light on the features of a Payment for Environmental 
Services, the ICMS-E, that fit within the scopes of the REDD9 strategies. The legal framework 
that has enabled and formalized the implementation of the mechanism throughout the 
country is regarded as determinant to the policy’s outcomes. Given that my goal is to 
establish the analogies and differences between two states’ fiscal incentive schemes, it is, 
indeed, relevant to understand the historic aspects towards their applications. Moreover, I 
underline the effects of the Opportunity Costs as to the evaluation of the mechanism and its 
perception by local decision makers and land owners. The fiscal distribution impact and the 
quality of preservation are also discussed in this review.  
 
2.1- The Ecological ICMS in Mato Grosso 
 
As mentioned earlier in this document, by synthetizing the conception, the Ecological ICMS 
or ICMS-E handles mainly about a state’s financial mechanism to reallocate revenue 
generated through an added-value tax, the ICMS10. This dynamic follows the concept of the 
ecological fiscal transfers. That is, the transfers that concern any payment transaction, within 
the PES scope, regarding compensation for biodiversity protection purposes. These 
transactions usually take the form of lump-sum or specific transfers based on indicators. 
However, as we shall see, its properties are quite peculiar if we consider that this PES 
modality has been implemented in a political environment that follows a Fiscal Federalism 
                                                          
9
 REDD is the United Nations’ strategic program for reducing emissions, from deforestation and forest 
degradation, and for the support of conservation and sustainable management of forests. The abbreviation 
also derives the concept that denotes the program for enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries (REDD+). 
10
 Being able to differentiate between ICMS and ICMS-E is imperative. Although they look and sound like similar 
acronyms, payment wise, they just represent opposite transactions. While ICMS is an operation, in financial 
terms, that collects tax revenue, the ICMS-E is a credit transferred to stakeholders in order to compensate for 
ecological services. 
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context. Any positive outcome extracted from this experience deserves to be analyzed and 
cherished, since its objective is, indeed, the full protection of natural land cover. 
Furthermore, this opportunity is founded on the firm grounds of the 1988 Constitution, 
which conceived that 25% of each state-level-revenue should be reallocated according to the 
needs of the states. Brazil’s Constitution, moreover, determines that 75% of the amount 
transferred to the local municipalities must be distributed following their performance in 
generating the added-value tax. This scope sets the overall conditions in which the Ecological 
ICMS operates in every state, whether they are members of the program or not. Paraná´s 
experience in implementing the payment for land services became an inspiration to other 
important states, as to their economic weight (e.g. Minas Gerais and São Paulo) to follow. 
These two states implemented the policy in 1996. In the subsequent fiscal year, Rondonia, 
the fourth state to adopt the ICMS-E, also became an important reference, given the 
relevance of its region (the North Region) where much of the land cover belongs to the 
Amazon Forest (GRIEG-GRAN, 2000; LOUREIRO W. e., 2008; RING I. e., 2009; MAY, NETO, 
DENARDIN, & LOUREIRO, 2002). Next, I try to thoroughly introduce the historical and legal 
development of this policy in Paraná and Mato Grosso states.  
 
 
2.2-  Legal Framework of ICMS Ecológico 
 
Legislative terms in Paraná: 
 
The ecological ICMS as known in literature today was legally framed from the new federal 
laws established by the Brazil’s Constitution, in 1988. This fiscal transfer policy, at the time, 
surges as a response to the municipalities’ demands that there should be compensation for 
the increase of restricted areas due to environmental purposes. Within this context, Paraná 
became the first state in the federation to implement an incipient concept of what would 
later turn out into a fiscal policy. LOUREIRO (1998) emphasizes that the state used to 
transfer revenues as payment for services varying up to 175 distinct conservation ends. This 
trend pushed the state to adopt a framework that could cover the losses of municipal open 
areas. That setting ended up limiting investments and use by both public and private land 
owners.  
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May (2002) reminds us that Piraraquara was one of those cases. The municipality used to 
have 90% of its entire territory as protected area containing a relevant watershed aimed to 
supply Curitiba’s metropolitan region, the capital of the Paraná State. The imbalances caused 
by the unfair distribution of land, as to their services provided, and the gains, by more 
populated areas, led the affected municipalities, in the surroundings, to become more 
politically engaged and intensify their legislative demands. As a result, local and state 
administration’s representatives started to become more sensitive to the debate regarding 
necessary rewards to both voluntary and, in some cases, involuntary protected areas.  
So, the central idea was to compensate the protected regions given the constrains caused by 
these utilizations. Consequently, an amend to the Constitution, dated from 1989, expedited 
the implementation of the ICMS-E as a Paraná’s state law (Law No. 59/1991) 11. Thereafter, 
other amends and state laws helped the evolution of the tax transfer as to its criterion. May 
(2009) points out that the legal details and demands were further specified, so the state 
could better organize its revenue-sharing reallocation system. The progress in the provisions 
of the law enabled the government agencies to better operationalize the distribution of the 
payments according to the criteria which basically incorporated the conservation areas and 
quality of preservation (MAY, NETO, DENARDIN, & LOUREIRO, 2002).  
Since the implementation of the environmental criterion, also referred to a “quality clause”, 
the amount reserved for payment resulting from a simple straight-forward calculation 
(considering the percentage of the value added tax) was reduced from 80 to 75%. Today, 5% 
of the ICMS (added value tax) must observe the environmental conditions (other criteria 
such as area and population have been kept unchanged).  
The Biodiversity Conservation Coefficient (Coeficiênte de Conservação da Biodiversidade, 
CCB) is an environmental index that estimates the factor that supports the sums endowed to 
the municipalities that maintain the protected areas, also known as Conservation Unities. 
The CCB considers the preservation of the surface area and the surface area of the local 
community in which the intervention takes place. The surface area can be classified due to 
the physical quality of the preservation, assuming that the better the nature is preserved, 
the higher the value is achieved from the coefficient. This measurement also applies to the 
                                                          
11
 The original Portuguese version of the State Decree 2.791/96 law text can be found at: 
http://www.meioambiente.pr.gov.br/arquivos/File/cobf/compilacao_legislacao_icms_ecologico.pdf 
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areas in the process of being recuperated. The surface area of the municipality is also 
impacted by a conservation factor related to the management inputs (LOUREIRO W. , O 
ICMS Ecológico na Biodiversidade, 2002). 
Paraná’s criteria has been adopted as a benchmark in several other states in Brazil. May 
(2009) examines that the approach concerning qualitative control, besides the calculus 
regarding the preserved areas (dimensions of Conservation Unities), is a significant progress. 
This measurement has enabled communities to both evaluate improvements over time and 
mitigate inappropriate management of the conservation unities.  The result of the municipal 
conservation coefficient is the sum of the conservation coefficients of each municipality by 
the total of the state. These factors are then calculated into the allocated ICMS-E as to 
biodiversity protection (50 per cent). Municipal rights under the ICMS-E regime are 
accumulated with their regular revenue shares from the ICMS (added-value tax) taxation 
system, and are passed on to municipal governments on a weekly basis. The distribution also 
accounts in the annual ICMS added-tax revenue. Thus, the index is calculated as follows: 
 
Procedures to calculate the ICMS-E in Paraná: 
Our first step is to clarify the definition toward the concept of Conservation Unity. Loureiro 
et al. (2008) highlight that the Conservation Unity may receive special treatment to its 
coefficient, which is calculated by the guidelines stated at the Paraná Environmental 
Institute’s ordinance (ruling established by the second paragraph of the state law). The 
decision stresses that the forest management categories must be observed as the following 
sequence (prioritization): 
 
a) Municipal Conservation Unities 
b) State level Conservation Unities 
c) Federal Conservation Unities 
 
The law enforces that all Conservation Unities must be registered in the state’s registration 
database which is maintained by the Environmental Institute of Paraná (IAP – Instituto 
Ambiental do Paraná). Nevertheless, the second paragraph of Article 4 also determines that 
the registration procedure, in order to meet the objectives laid out in its law’s caput, must 
consider a Conservation Unity as: portions of national territory, including territorial waters, 
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with natural features of significant value, public or private, legally imposed by the 
Represented Public Power with goals and limits, under special administration regime, which 
guarantees appropriate conservation practices" considering the following Management 
categories: 
 
Biological Reserve Private Reserves of Natural Heritage 
Ecological Station; Forestry 
Parks Fauna Reserves 
Natural Monuments Extraction Reserves 
Wildlife Refuges  Areas of Environmental Protection 
 
Next, I shall attempt to introduce the schedule of calculation of the conservation index  
established by the Paraná´s State Decree 2.791/96 (artigo 3.º do Decreto Estadual n.º 
2.791/96): The basic calculation is represented by the ratio of the surface protected and the 
total area of the municipality times the Conservation Factor. This component relates to the 
various categories of Conservation Unity Management and other protected areas. Where 
CCBij denotes the Basic Biodiversity Conservation Coefficient (Coeficiente de Conservação da 
Biodiversidade básico); 
(1)        
   
  
       
The variable Auc is the Area of the Municipal Conservation Unity, according to physical 
quality (from the Portuguese description “área da Unidade de Conservação no município, de 
acordo com sua qualidade física”); Am is the Area of the Muncipal total territory (área total 
do território municipal); Fc denotes the variable Conservation factor attributed to the 
Conservation Unities as to the respective management categories (fator de conservação, 
variável, atribuído às Unidades de Conservação em função das respectivas categorias de 
manejo);The next equation introduces the qualitative variables measuring each 
Conservation Unity. Notably, the relationship of these qualitative variables presents a 
relevant incremental effect. In other words, the equation below reflects an important 
positive correlation, also known as a “vertical feedback”; that is, the better a CU is kept 
preserved, the higher the transfer provided by the state to the municipality ( Governo do 
Paraná, 2012). 
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(2)         [      (           )]   
Where        depicts the Interface Biodiversity Conservation Coefficient (Coeficiente de 
Conservação da Biodiversidade por Interface);        denotes the Conservation Unity’s 
variational quality (variação da qualidade da Unidade de Conservação); and P  is the 
weighting rate introduced in paragraph 2 (peso ponderado na forma do parágrafo 2º); 
(3)         ∑       
       represents the Municipal Biodiversity Conservation Coeficient and is equivalent to 
the sum of all Interface Conservation Coefficients estimated to the county (Coeficiente de 
Conservação da Biodiversidade para o Município, equivalente a soma de todos os 
Coeficientes de Conservação de Interface calculados para o município); 
(4)            
     
      
       
 Where      denotes the payment share gained by the municipality as to the Conservation 
Unities and         expresses the aggregated Municipal Biodiversity Conservation 
Coeficient. Since the total amount of state revenue, originated with ICMS (the added-value 
tax), is limited to the yearly state’s tax yield, the level of revenue attainment reached 
through the Municipal Factor 2  is accordingly subject to the aggregated transfer of ICMS-E 
revenue made by the state administration (percentual calculado, a ser destinado ao 
município, referente às Unidades de Conservação, Fator Municipal 2); Thus, the ratio of 
revenue earmarked to the municipalities (both new and old entrants) through this policy 
may possibly face a decrease if the rate of change in relation to  the total state’s collection of 
ICMS does not increase at least as fast as the rate of the new entries changes (see increase 
in tax revenue due to economic growth in “Revenue” and “Government Measurement” in 
Hindricks & Myles, 2006). Intuitively, an example of a situation where this condition would 
not hold is the case in which the rate of change, occasioned by the new municipalities 
entering the policy’s membership, is the same as the rate of change that the revenue 
increases due to an aggregated expansion in commerce and services as taxable economic 
activities (HINDRIKS & MYLES, 2006). At a first glance, in the equation above, new entrants 
into the policy membership would diminish the other participants’ share of ICMS-E, in some 
cases, even if the latter had augmented their protected areas and/or improved their quality 
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control standards. However, it is also true that an increase in the state’s ICMS revenue 
would also offset that trend (assuming that both rates of change turn out equivalent). 
Furthermore, inversely, there could be even a surplus, in the case that the rate of change 
that depicts the taxable economic activity is greater than the rate of new entries in the 
policy membership.  
 
Legislative terms in Mato Grosso: 
 
According to SEMA-MT12, the state of Mato Grosso, institutionalized the complementary 
decree N. 073 (Lei Complementar nº 073), on December, 07th of 2000; This law institutes the 
ICMS Ecológico in that state. Thereafter, the law was regulated through the state decree nº 
2.758 (Decreto Estadual nº 2.758), on July 16th 2001 (VIANA, 2000).  Thus, the oldest primary 
dataset regarding the implementation of ICMS Ecológico in Mato Grosso, until the present 
date, has accumulated information for no longer than ten years. 
According to the ICMS Ecológico state law, we observe that the criteria to calculate the index 
of Municipal Participation (Índices de Participação dos Municípios no ICMS) states two major 
environmental conditions:  
 Unity of Conservation/ Indigenous Territories (CU/IT), in which 5% of the ICMS 
revenue, related to each municipality, is distributed as the first year of the program 
membership acceptance (2002). 
 
 Environmental Sanitation (Saneamento Ambiental), in which 2% of the ICMS revenue, 
related to each municipality, is distributed to each location, starting at the third 
accounting year as from the program membership acceptance (2004). 
However, an amend in January 2004 (Lei Complementar nº 157. Art. 2º.), inaugurated a new 
criteria for the municipalities’ participation index with regard to the added value tax ICMS, 
the origin of the ICMS Ecológico. The new law eliminated the Environmental Sanitation 
criteria and preserved the Conservation Unities/Indigenous Territories criteria, with a  
compensation of 5%. 
                                                          
12
 SEMA MT – Mato Grosso State’s Department of Environment.  
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(5)       
                                        
              
 
In 2004, the State Law arbitrated the Revenue as we can see in the table 4; Added-value 
(75%), Own Fiscal Revenue (4%), Population (4%), Municipality Area (1%), Social Coefficient 
(11%) and Conservation Unities/Indigenous Land (5%).13 
Other paragraphs of the amend State Law n.º 73, 2000 (Lei Complementar  n.º 73, de 07 de 
dezembro de 2000) expressed the following:   
Caput 3: In order to calculate the Own Fiscal Revenue index, take into account the ratio 
provided by the fiscal revenue budget of each municipality subjected to the sum of all fiscal 
revenues to all municipalities. The fiscal term is based on the second accounting year prior 
to the antecedent year; this is supplied by the State’s Court of Auditors.  
Caput 4: As to attaining the Population Criterion, take the percentage resulting from the 
population living in the municipality divided by total population in Mato Grosso; this is 
supplied by the Brazilian Geography and Statistic Institute – IBGE.  
Caput 5: The computation of “Área do Município” (Municipal Area) is the result of 
percentage of each municipal area and the total area of the State; this is supplied by any 
official Mato Grosso state’s department.  
Caput 6: Estimating the “Cota Igual” (Equal Share) requires the calculation of the result given 
by the percentages pre-established in the “Parágrafo Único” (unique paragraph), found in 
the second caput of this Act, times the total number of municipalities in the state (number of 
municipalities considered up to December the 31st of the previous year).  
Caput 7- The “Saneamento Ambiental” (Environmental Sanitation) criterion must observe 
the capitation, treatment and distribution of the water supply system and garbage collection 
besides the treatment and disposal of solid wastes and the sanitary sewage systems in the 
municipalities. (SEMA-MT, 2011)In Mato Grosso, the Conservation Unities are constituted as 
follows: 
 
  
                                                          
13
 See tables 4 and 10, “ICMS-E in Mato Grosso and Fiscal Allocation Criteria” , in the Appendix. 
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Biologic Reserves Private Reserves of Natural Heritage Environmentally Protected Areas 
Ecologic Stations Forests Sustainable Developed Areas 
Parks Fauna Reserves Park Roads 
Natural Monuments Extraction Reserves Specially Protected Areas 
Wild Life Refuges  Highly Relevant Ecologic Areas  
 
According to the complementary decree N. 073 (Lei Complementar nº 073), the 
Conservation Unity calculation schedule must follow the calculation schedule: 
Conservation Unit/ Indigenous Land (referred in Article 8, "caput" of the Complementary 
Act). To calculate this criterion, one should obtain the product of the percentage (specified 
in paragraph of article 2 of the Act: see table 10 in the appendix section) and the ratio 
between the Conservation Unit of the Municipality factor (    ) multiplied by the State’s 
Conservation Factor (   ), defined as below:  
(6)                 
Where      is the index of the Conservation Unit / Indigenous Municipality "i".      factor 
is the Conservation of the City "i".        denotes the summation of all municipality’s 
Conservation Factors     . X is the percentage set for the criterion Conservation Unit / 
Indigenous Land. Thereafter, calculate the Conservation Unit factor (     ) for each unit of 
conservation, or indigenous land, through the relationship between the area of conservation 
units or indigenous land and the total county area, weighted by the correction factor (  ): 
(7)        
             
      
 
Where       Factor = Conservation Conservation Unit "j" or Indigenous Land "j". in the City 
"i".           = Area of conservation "j" or indigenous land in the county "i".        = Area 
of the City "i".    = Correction Factor for the type of management of conservation areas:  
Calculate the factor of the Municipality of Conservation (    ) by summing up all of 
Conservation Unit/ existing indigenous lands factors in the municipality “i”:  
(8)       ∑      
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2.3-  Property Rights and Opportunity Costs 
 
Whenever land owners, whether they are private or public, save their properties to protect 
forest resources, they give up the possibility to receive additional payments for the services 
or goods that they could extract from that space. Those foregone benefits are named the 
opportunity costs. In this section, I shall try to provide readers with a coarse explanation of 
how these costs influence decisions made by the land owners.  BöRNER et al. (2009) propose 
a model to calculate the opportunity costs derived from the protected forests in the Amazon 
Region. Their model takes into account few pre-defined assumptions so a calculation 
schedule can be processed using data generated by Brazilian institutions and researcher’s 
analysis. Moreover, in a pilot project with local observations, Börner et al. (2009) have 
analyzed the deforestation impact and its response followed by benefits paid in a municipal 
level. Conversely, the aggregated level estimates costs considering the Amazon Federal 
States (all combined form the so called Legal Amazon). Here, deforestation is expressed in 
terms of agricultural expansion. Taking land owner’s profit margins into account in the 
equation, their estimative provides policymakers with a close picture of what the costs to 
protect areas and their biodiversity are. Therefore, we need to define the Net Benefits as 
output resulted from the land services; i.e.: cattle ranching , timber extractions, etc. As 
mentioned earlier in this document, both cattle ranching and crop plantations are 
considered increasing and devastating threats to the natural forests in Mato Grosso. These 
trends clearly resemble the postulations of the Open Access theory14 as well. Furthermore, 
the quality of documentation regarding local development and economic growth, by sectors, 
is essential so an accurate estimate can provide analysts with robust data about the reality 
on the ground. However, measurement of economic activity dependent on land tenure 
terms is not always so accurate throughout the Amazon region; what imposes serious 
difficulties so a fine estimate can be made. Although a precise and detailed database analysis 
is possible (AZZONI & ISAIB, 1994; BöRNER, 2009), our objective in this section is rather to 
register the model utilized to determine the opportunity costs and benefits to all major   
                                                          
14
 Find further definition and approach to the Open Access problem in Gordon, H.S.(1954). 
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categories of land owners than to properly offer a reasonable estimative of the opportunity 
costs in Mato Grosso and Paraná. In the model set up by Börner et al. (2009), we shall see 
that, for simplicity, the benefits generated with untouched natural forestry are not 
considered (standing forest services). Moreover, the discount factor applied over time 
suggests that the estimates should reflect a sequential calculation schedule. The effects of 
multiple usages of land and their cycles can be illustrated by the dynamics of the timber 
extraction that usually follows a sequence: short period of cropping prior to land becomes 
meadow for cattle and annual cropping (permanent or itinerant). Thereafter continuing 
cropping takes place. Studies indicate that these land-use trajectories, where deforestation 
has occurred, show similar paths (VOSTI, WITCOVER, & CARPENTIER, 2002).  The Net Present 
Value allows us to estimate the level of economic returns to the land usage over time. Thus, 
the calculation can be done as follows: 
(9)           (  
  
  
) 
The net profit per hectare of crop k that belongs to the municipality “i” is represented by 
   . Where      expresses the annual gross returns per hectare in “i” estimated from the 
PAM/PPM/PEV data. “b” denotes the gross returns. Variable “c” accounts for the total costs 
extracted from data sets containing: deforestation level, per hectare returns, municipal-level 
per hectare biomass, deforestation forecasts as well as location and size of land-reform 
settlements and protected areas. 
(10)       ∑
        
        
   
        
        
   
        
        
 
In the expression above k denotes the cropp type/land uses and NPV depicts the Net Present 
Value of land-use “j” per hectare in municipality “i”, within the trajectory, and having 
terminal period T equal to 10. 
(11)       ∑
∑         
      
   
Where      is the Net Present Value per ha in municipality “i”; “s” is the share of land-use 
trajectory “j” in the total municipality’s annual land-use expansion. The      represents the 
net present value of a ten-year-period of trajectory “j” in municipality “i”. The interest rate is 
depicted by “r”. An important feature of the ICMS-E as a PES policy is that the ultimate seller 
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of the services is the municipality where the protected area is located. However, this 
interpretation must be further defined since the constituency of the land tenure may vary 
among actors and land use purposes. 
(12)                                
Börner et al. (2009) postulate that in order for policy makers to adopt PES as a candidate for 
their REDD strategy, a distributional impact analysis needs to shed light on the 
characteristics of the chosen beneficiaries. The total Net Benefit, thus, becomes the 
summation of Net Benefits shared by the potential recipients represented above by 
Indigenous Lands (IL), Sustainable Use Areas (SU), Land Reform Settlements (RS), Small 
Landholders and Community Lands (SL) and Large Landholders (LL). However, if the Net 
Benefit considers the public representative (e.g.: a municipality allocating Conservation 
Unities) as the sole beneficiary, it logically implies that there is no benefit being distributed 
to any other seller category. This comprehension falls perfectly into the study of the ICMS-E 
case for instance. 
(13)                  
Net Benefits for each service provider category is expressed in the equation above, where “i” 
is the type of seller. Moreover, AD is the amount of additional REDD each seller category can 
supply, whereas P is the per hectare price paid to avoid deforestation or ton of emissions. 
OC denotes the opportunity cost per seller classification. (e.g.: the correspondent to NPVj in 
equation (10)).  Since the Net Benefits of service providers are the product of amounts 
received as payment less the opportunity cost, disregarding the transaction costs, the 
rewards substantially differ among the seller’s categories. Pricing is, for instance, a factor 
that hints why the solution for the social problem is not so trivial. Other mechanisms also 
play an impact such as governments and other institutional funders trading for emission 
offsets. In Mato Grosso, 56,3% of the territory is included in the region known as Floresta 
(Amazon Biome).  Deforestation in the Amazon Region is widely understood to take place in 
the stretch best known “arc of deforestation” (see figure 12). This territorial stripe goes all 
the way from the southeastern borders to all the northeastern borders of the Brazilian 
Amazon forest. The open access to the region, stimulated by traffic on important inter-state 
roads, is also considered a factor of deforestation (eg.: Transamazonian Highway). However, 
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one question remains unanswered. As to the distributional impact caused by the ICMS-E, can 
the Opportunity Cost determine any economic preference when the PES Net Benefits are 
not related to direct payments to private/organizational land-owners? According to the 
Brazilian Fiscal Federalism revenue structure, in fact, when Municipalities prohibit access to 
any area in their constituency, the revenue generated with the added-value tax ICMS, mainly 
from land-use15, may decrease (SEFAZ- MT, 2012). Azzoni and Isai (1994) evidence the impact 
of the foregone benefits by municipalities. This happens in the form of less tax revenue as a 
result of restricted economic activities.  
 In an aggregated level, the result of the ICMS is expressed by the accumulated commerce 
and service activities generated in a state (the added-value tax is largest revenue source of 
the states). From a pure financial perspective (no other aspect taken into account such as 
environmental policies, etc.), the membership of the municipalities in the ICMS-E Program 
only makes sense if their PES Net Benefits exceed the Opportunity Costs of the area to be 
protected. Thus, the indirect benefit of promoting any taxable activity also influences the 
decision of policy makers, not only in a municipal-state level but also in a federal level. Such 
development takes place especially in states like Mato Grosso where farming and 
agribusiness activities are intense and threatening to the local biodiversity. Börner et al. 
(2009) show that forest loss has a history of being most aggressive in Mato Grosso and Pará 
states, where cattle and crops have been handled in an expansive manner. These economic 
interests have hardly ever been so openly expressed as in the current debate for the reform 
of the “Código Florestal” (Forestry Code)16. Partisan negotiations have been dominating the 
agenda of the Brazilian Congress for the past two years and clearly justify why cropping and 
ranching have become an increasing share of the product-mix-revenue to the local 
administrations in those states (Câmara, 2012). Thus, limiting access to land may impose 
constrains related to the economic development of certain protected area’s categories. 
Moreover, this dynamic may result in increased opportunity costs. In other hand, production   
                                                          
15
 Assume business-as-usual: to support the argument, we disregard any increase in per ha. Productivity, which 
could offset losses from the reduced areas for plantation and ranching. 
16
 The current Forestry Code (Código Florestal Brasileiro) was established in September of 1965 (Federal Law 
4.771/65) and determines that limitation to the land use for private purposes. The land use must also be 
subjected to the common and public interest so the natural vegetation on Brazilian soil can be protected. The 
first Brazilian Forestry Code was launched through the Decree 23.793 in January of 1934. 
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costs are not relevant for ecological fiscal transfer because they are defined as costs of 
current protection measurements. Usually, these costs are not related to policies earmarked 
to directly finance biodiversity conservation. In practice, it is hard to precisely determine the 
total costs (management, opportunity and transaction costs) and benefits at different spatial 
levels associated with protected areas (RING I. e., Assessing Fiscal Transfers for Conservation 
Policies, 2011). 
  
2.4-  Distribution Impact and Discussion  
 
The combination of the various economic factors and the criteria as to the various 
applications of this policy in different states is what actually determines the fiscal impact of 
this mechanism. The alteration of the value added tax (ICMS) is an important and 
considerable driver of how the index can vary substantially. As an example, in a municipality 
named Jamari (located in the Rondônia State), the revenue showed a drastic variance due to 
the increase of the value added tax (about 500%) concerning that municipality in 1995. As a 
response, the total Jamari’s ICMS-E index for the years 1997 and 1998 rose extraordinarily. 
Thus, a close look at how the economic factors are affected by the environmental criteria’s 
weight is necessary and vice-versa (GRIEG-GRAN, 2000). There are both endogenous and 
exogenous determinants that may influence the overall result of the benefit to be 
transferred to each municipality. Minas Gerais State, for instance, promoted an important 
restructuring of the added-value taxation system before the state introduced its 
environmental criterion. These changes in the fiscal law became widely known as the Robin 
Hood Law17.  
The distribution impact resulting from the adoption of the ICMS-E is the topic of a 
controversial debate of whether the growth of the economic activity within the state should 
be taken as a setback as to the revenue participation of the municipalities or a driver for 
conservation consciousness.  FERNANDES et al. (2010) provide a probabilistic model about 
the likelihood of municipalities to join the ICMS-E program. In the model, it is claimed that 
the value received by the municipalities (where VAi is the “Added-Value Criteria”) is a 
                                                          
17
 A fiscal distribution system intended to diminish the allocation to the wealthier districts and contribute more 
with the poorer ones (FERNANDES L. L., COELHO, FERNANDES, & LIMA, 2011). 
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negative coefficient since the higher the municipality’s economic activity, the higher is 
nature degradation. This outcome, thus, is considered as a negative variable towards 
biodiversity protection which, in their model, is used to reduce the probability of the 
municipality to receive the benefit. However, in practice, this seems to be the case when we 
look at the data provided by the São Paulo State’s Environmental Secretary, for instance. 
Historically, São Paulo is a widely known as a state with intense industrial activity. From 2006 
to 2010, the number of municipalities receiving the ICMS increased just from 180 to 18518 
while the total ICMS-E transfers received by the cities increased 49%, in average, for the 
same period (SMA - SP, 2012). While the national GDP increased 24,3%  from 2006 to 2010, 
the São Paulo GDP increased 23,4% (IBGE, 2011). This leads to the argument that an 
increased aggregated value of economic activity in the state has rather increased the added-
value income base, which, consequently, contributed with the increase of the sums passed 
over to the municipalities. Is the quantitative aspect of the state economic growth enough to 
determine whether the value-added criteria should be taken as negative driver? Or does the 
quality of the economic drivers also matter as to the implementation of Payments for 
Ecological Services? There is robust evidence of positive influences of GDP on the rate of 
forest conservation. Findings show that the effect of forest protection on the rates of forest 
cover change relies on economic development (EWERS, 2005). These questions certainly 
remain as the debates toward the Distributional Impact of the ICMS-E evolve but I shall not 
attempt to discuss them here. Fernandes et al. (2010) suggests that, in the beginning of the 
policy implementation, the small and medium communities (up to 100.000 inhabitants) had 
an advantage over the large base of ICMS collected in Minas Gerais. However, this 
distributional weight changed as from 2000 when new municipalities started to become 
eligible to receive the ICMS-E, thus, reducing everyone’s share.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
18
 Namely, the five municipalities in São Paulo that joined the ICMS-E fiscal transfers between 2006 and 2010 
were Anhembi, Campo Limpo Paulista, Itupeva, Indaituba, and Jarinu.  
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Figure 1: History of ICMS-E in Minas Gerais: Ecological ICMS transferred to the Minas 
Gerais municipalities, in Brazilian Real (R$) and number of municipalities that received the 
benefit from 1997 to 2007. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Nevertheless, figure 1 depicts another outcome; both the expansion of municipalities joining 
the policy and the total value of ICMS-E being distributed increased (FERNANDES L. L., 
COELHO, FERNANDES, & LIMA, 2011). But, the average amount transferred by the state, per 
municipality, declined over time. Given the low Conservation Unity Criteria’s percentage 
with respect to value earmarked for the ICMS-E, in Minas Gerais19, this evidence strengths 
the argument that the more municipalities joining this PES modality would reduce the 
absolute value transferred to each member. Therefore, the Ecological ICMS has been 
characterized as the “Jogo de Soma Zero” (Game of Zero Sum); as municipalities join the 
incentive, the per-capta percentage is reduced (JOÃO, 2004). This might be the case in the 
short run. However, achieving efficiency in distribution requires that marginal increase in 
value received by each municipality equals the increase in the number of municipalities at 
                                                          
19
 See table 2 in the appendix section of this Thesis. 
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the margin as well (PERMAN, MA, Mc GILVRAY, & COMMON, 1996). Assuming that all 
municipalities in any state joins the program, at once, the average transfer would fall 
sharply. But the increase in the number of new members would obviously stabilize at zero 
leading to a more equal spatial distribution of the resources.  
In the rank of states that have earmarked the Ecological by the Conservation Unity Criteria, 
Rondonia comes first. Out of a total amount paid in transfers in 2009 of R$ 402,7 millions, 
Rodnônia earmarked R$ 90.7 millions. Mato Grosso and São Paulo came in second and third 
places. They earmarked respectively R$ 78 million and R$ 68,4 million. Although Paraná is 
the first state in total earmarked ICMS-E, Rondônia distributed more with respect to the 
Conservation Unity Criteria due to the 5% coefficient (MEDEIROS, YOUNG, C.E.F., & PAVESE, 
2011).  
Grieg-Gran (2000) claims that the comparison carried on her studies, between Minas Gerais 
and Rondônia, shows how the distribution system needs to be analyzed and comprehended 
prior to the implementation of the ICMS-E. For instance, in Minas Gerais, in order to 
implement the new criteria, it was possible to reduce the weight given to ICMS (added-value 
tax) because this was greater than the 75% minimum required by the Constitution. Whereas, 
In Rondônia, the weight given to the ICMS was already at 75% at the time the norm was 
instituted. Without redistribution on the weight of the necessary criteria, the ICMS-E 
calculation would hit all municipalities, including those with protected areas. Although the 
ICMS-E is considered as an incremental fiscal transfer policy, it is needed to be clear that it 
also imposes a task to the public finances of all localities due to their budget planning (NETO, 
2008; SEFAZ- MT, 2012).  
Furthermore, Grieg-Gran (2000) ponders that the history of ICMS-E in Rondonia and Minas 
Gerais, at the time of the data analysed, had showed similar paths as to their distributional 
impact. Barely, 60% of the municipalities had turn out to be better-off as result of their 
program membership. She claims that for the approximately remaining 40%, the negative 
counter-weight, pressured by the diminishing value that was observed in Rondônia due to 
the “equal share criterion” and in Minas Gerais due to the added-value tax revenue, offset 
the rewarding performance of the conservation criterion.  
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2.5-  Quality of Preservation – A Determinant Criterion? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ecological ICMS presents higher levels of effectiveness when the cycle of biodiversity 
protection and investment in environment promotes sustainable development at the local 
level. Thus a balanced investment of the attained resources in social welfare and 
improvement of the quality of public provisions is as much necessary as the full protection of 
biodiversity (SILVA, FREITAS, & WEISS, 2009). Therefore, an important factor that can further 
increase the dividends of the municipalities as to all the frontiers cited above is the quality of 
protection. In Paraná, as we have overseen, the quality of preservation is safeguarded by the 
state law. So far, this is not the case in Mato Grosso. This binding legal mechanism is 
determinant to increment the reinvestment of the incentive in activities that raise 
environmental awareness. Otherwise, the outcome may cause distortions. Emblematically, 
Novo Santo Antonio (municipality located in the Cerrado Biome) received the highest 
absolute ICMS-E transfer in Mato Grosso R$ 2.042.285,00 in 200920. An outstanding result 
that, considering the ICMS-E per capta, puts the city on top of the state’s rank with R$ 
967,7121; the average per-capta ICMS-E of the state is R$ 88,03. The reason why the 
municipality, while having an area of 4.368 Km2 (average area of the municipalities receiving 
the incentive in Mato Grosso is 8.598 Km2), presents such an expressive performance is 
rather connected to the fact that much of its territory (approx. 230.000 hectares) lies within 
the Araguaia State Park. Although the Araguaia state is managed by the FEMA-MT (Mato 
                                                          
20
 See tables 5,6 and 7, “Winners and Losers Analysis”, on pages 78-80 . 
21
 Value follows my own calculation schedule based on data acquired from SEMA-MT. 
“The primary aim of ecological fiscal transfers is to compensate the relevant jurisdictions 
for the land‐use restrictions imposed by protected areas that in economic terms relate to 
the opportunity costs of these protected areas. Due to this compensation the provision of 
the related public good ‘protected areas’ may or may not increase (there is no earmarking 
or contingency, except in Paraná due to quality assessment).” 
Ring et al. (2011) 
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Grosso’s Enviromental Foundation), it lacks adequate infra-structure and administration to 
monitor the conservation quality. Its big environmental concern is the recurrent forest 
burning within the Park limits. The Araguaia State Park was the third most frequent 
Conservation Unity’s fire focal point in 2010 (SEMA-MT, 2011). Without the necessary law 
enforcement, a solution to the distortions caused by this policy implementation hinges on 
the dynamic and commitment of the local authorities to pursue the best or, at least, 
reasonable results. This aftereffect seems to be reduced in Paraná. A simulation shows that  
a Conservation Unity classified as “Park Management” (local management) and located in 
the north of the state, that extends for 40 hectares, may reach a maximum quality 
assessment that accounts for approximately 1.200 hectares in the ICMS-E calculation 
schedule (LOUREIRO W. , O ICMS Ecológico na Biodiversidade, 2002). The first equation (1), 
which was presented here earlier, introduces the qualitative variables measuring each 
conservation unity. Such variables present an incremental effect and provides an “vertical 
feedback”, that is the better a CU is kept preserved, the higher is the income provided to the 
municipalities. This Conservation Unity would score as up to 30 times more what a 
Conservation Unity would have achieved if its assessment was based only on area (without 
applying the quality variables). Thus, municipalities are better-off when they protect the 
biodiversity in those areas than just acquiring more land, for conservation purposes, and 
then abandoning them afterwards ( Governo do Paraná, 2012). However, Peter May (2002) 
provides some relevant considerations about the quality factor. In Paraná, technicians and 
public agents have learned from their past experiences since the policy was implemented. By 
improving their quality of protection, municipalities improve their performance which 
consequently leads to increase their participation in the state’s added-value taxation stake. 
Furthermore, the ICMS-E can help promote what has been perceived to be a “virtuous 
cycle”, a process in which expertise, environmental awareness and social transformation are 
shared by all actors (communities, policy makers and public representatives) (MAY, NETO, 
DENARDIN, & LOUREIRO, 2002; Governo do Paraná, 2012). However, May et al. (2002) 
question about the transparency on accessibility of the financial records and data sustaining 
the ICMS-E transactions (rewards regarding the Conservation Unities) in all cases; no matter 
the state has introduced the quality factor or not. Nevertheless, the quality criterion needs 
to be applied as a dynamic element of the mechanism. Thus, a recurrent evaluation can push 
the improvement of UC categories, reward localities, punish negligent municipalities, 
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instruct the allocation of financial resources and induce local environmental planning (MAY, 
NETO, DENARDIN, & LOUREIRO, 2002).  
Quality of biodiversity preservation is not a trivial criterion to be estimated. JOÃO (2004) 
provides an in depth description of the parameter to be considered in the quality factor 
analysis of the Conservation Unities. Her scheme proposes a calculation of the Vegetation 
Coverage Variable through the arithmetic mean of two components: the Quality Variable 
and the Diversity Variables. So a good quality performance (Vegetation Coverage) can be 
achieved, Conservation Unitie’s administrations should invest in maintenance and 
restoration of the natural habitat diversity by keeping its features simultaneously (JOÃO, 
2004).  
Furthermore, biological diversity is built upon an extensive set of livelihood characteristics. 
Capturing all these features is an enormous challenge due to the complex detail matrix; 
interlaced information web (LOUREIRO W. , O ICMS Ecológico na Biodiversidade, 2002). 
Biodiversity protection clearly requires the preservation of both the extension and the 
quality of the natural environment. Structural losses, modification and fragmentation alter 
the nutrients found in the vegetation and watersheds leading to a reduction of the 
ecosystem’s resilience and adaption capabilities. These claims push the need for proper and 
rational investments of financial resources even further (JOÃO, 2004; MAY, NETO, 
DENARDIN, & LOUREIRO, 2002). 
 
 
 
 3- Environment and the Welfare Theory  
 
 
 
 
 
In Public Economics, the procedure to analyze a policy is conducted by the development of a 
model and determining its equilibrium level. Therefore, Policy Analysis determines the 
effects of publicly empowered representative’s plans and actions. It helps to trace the 
relative changes of the economy’s equilibrium as to given patterns (PERMAN, MA, Mc 
GILVRAY, & COMMON, 1996). Furthermore, according to Barbieri and Lage (2001), 
regardless the intentions of any economic development policy, one should never disregard 
the global challenges. If policies are implemented to benefit any locality or region, it must 
consider the impacts that their outcomes can cause as to the worldwide ecological system’s 
equilibrium.  
While carrying out a policy assessment, one should understand the concepts of positive and 
normative analysis. The first (e.g.: positive analysis of government) investigates themes such 
as why and how a public sectors respond to the government’s interests and priorities. The 
reason why some policies are preferred, followed by their effects on economic 
development, is also spotted here. In other hand, normative analysis helps to identify the 
best policies. Thus, its objective is to defend the guidelines for reasonable and/or ideal 
government practices (PERMAN, MA, Mc GILVRAY, & COMMON, 1996). Eventual projects 
involving the two alternatives above are not necessarily disconnected from each other; a 
positive analysis is needed in order to run a normative analysis. It would be impossible to 
defend a policy as being good without considering alternative policies’ effects. A recurrent 
argument is that a positive analysis has no significance until it is put into practice as a guided 
policy. 
“Welfare economics is the branch of economic theory which has 
investigated the nature of the policy recommendations that the 
economist is entitled to make.” 
 
Baumol (1977), p. 496 
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Normative analyses are assumed to provide governments with the best options related to 
practices within a set of goals. In spite of that, Laissez-faire policies and other alternative 
ones need to be analyzed under the scope of the positive analysis. Additionally, the optimal 
policy is the one that seeks to achieve the best outcomes within the government’s goals. 
This expected optimal state is assessed once each of the several policies’ equilibriums are 
determined and analyzed (PERMAN, MA, Mc GILVRAY, & COMMON, 1996).  
 
3.1-  Social Welfare function and Optimality 
 
 
 
 
So the choice modeling can make sense within this study, we need to dominate the concepts 
behind the Social Welfare Function22. The relationship extracted from its reckoning can help 
us put this discussion under the perspective of allocation priorities. The Social Welfare 
Function has a parallel with that one of the individuals’ indifferences. But instead of 
proposing an expression of everyone’s preference, it represents everyone’s perception as to 
the social collective choices. An important aspect of the social welfare function is to specify 
how similar it is to any individual’s ordinary utility function when it faces minimum 
                                                          
22 A social welfare function is a worth-weighted function that rates feasible social states (alternative complete 
descriptions of the society) from lowest to highest. Entries of the function incorporate variables thought to 
influence the economic welfare of a society (SEN, Collective choice and social welfare, 1970). It turns out that 
the social welfare function becomes conceptually individualistic in its format, as we use it to quantify a person’s 
welfare measurement as to the need of goods or consumption of inputs. A conceivable application to this 
approach would be to exploit the social welfare function in order to discuss prospective models representing 
collective choices aimed to support alternative social positions (SEN & NUSSBAUM, The quality of life, 1993).  
 
“Losing forest diversity means missing opportunities for medicines, food, 
raw materials and employment opportunities, in one word: welfare.” 
FAO, Food and Agricultural Organization  
of the United Nations 
 39 
constrains that are often scrutinized in Welfare Economics (PERMAN et al. 1996). Thus, we 
examine an economy with two individuals where the SWF is generally expressed as: 
(14)             
The Welfare is assumed to be a non-decreasing function in    and   . Following this 
property, for any given level of    welfare can not decrease when    is expected to rise. For 
this reason, we embrace that    
  
   
  and     
  
   
  are similarly positive. Hence, our 
SWF responds equally to the characteristics of the utility function. Given that  the utility 
function relates numbers for value with combinations of consumption levels X and Y, a Social 
Welfare Function associates numbers for social welfare with combinations of utility levels 
   and   . Likewise, in the same way that a utility function can be illustrated with the 
indifference curves instrumental, so we can demonstrate the effects a Social Welfare 
Function. Maximization of welfare occurs where there is equivalence of the slopes of the 
social indifference curve, the utility curve and the utility possibility frontier; all these 
conditions  must be satisfied, correspondingly (PERMAN et al. 1996). Furthermore, this 
expression can be stated as such: 
(15) 
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
  
 
  
   
From the equalities above, we shall have the slope as to social welfare indifference curve on 
the left whereas the two other expressions represent slopes of the utility frontier. All slopes 
(indifference curve and utility frontier) are equal when social welfare is maximized. 
Moreover, it is impossible to reallocate goods and utility in order to increase social welfare 
between the consumers. Moving from a point, which is not efficient, to another that is 
efficient, to other person, does not necessarily result in a welfare improvement, although 
distributive efficiency is a necessary condition for an optimal outcome. It may even end up 
being a decreased level of social welfare. Considering that the SWF is non-decreasing in    
and     rising  
  
  
  without decreasing 
  
  
 leads to an enhanced social welfare (see PERMAN 
et al. 1996). If the allocation of two goods is considered fair among individuals, a Pareto 
improvement can be denoted as a fair outcome or a result that promotes equity. But this 
scenario is relativized as to the restrictions discussed within the utilitarianism approach.   
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3.2-  Efficiency, Effectiveness and Public Financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature considers the input-output ratio as the most elementary way of measuring 
efficiency. An example of this approach is to take education spending as an input that affects 
educational attainment rates; the latter is, then, understood as output. The concepts of 
efficiency and effectiveness combine the relationship among input, output and outcome as 
we can see in figure 2. Yet, contrasted to productivity measurement, the efficiency concept 
features the idea of the production possibility frontier, which implies feasible output levels 
given the scale of actions.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework of Efficiency and Effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
“The greater the output for a given input or the lower the input for a 
given output, the more efficient the activity is. Productivity, by 
comparison, is simply the ratio of outputs produced to input used”. 
 
(MANDL, DIERX, & ILZKOVITZ, 2008) 
Effectiveness 
 
Allocative Efficiency 
 
Technical Efficiency 
Enviromental Factors 
eg: Regulatory – competitive framework, socio-economic background, climate, 
economic development, functioning of the public administration 
Imput Output Outcome 
Monetary and  
non-monetary resources 
Figure 2 
"But still more definitely than patron saint of the modern theory of value 
is Pareto the patron saint of the "New Welfare Economics."" 
 
(Joseph Schumpeter, "Vilfredo Pareto, 1848-1923",  
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1948) 
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The difference between effectiveness and efficiency can be underlined by the type of result 
that we are analyzing. For instance, effectiveness is connected to the ultimate objectives of a 
policy or project. The outcome of such an experiment is, however, associated with the level 
of welfare or growth to be attained. Thus, effectiveness, as an aim, can be translated into a 
measurement of dynamics that are often influenced by complex factors. Therefore, due to 
interference of political preferences, effectiveness may be harder to estimate than efficiency 
(PERMAN, MA, Mc GILVRAY, & COMMON, 1996; MANDL, DIERX, & ILZKOVITZ, 2008).  
Mandl, U. et al. (2008) postulates that, although, output and outcome are two distinct ideas, 
their concepts remain vague. Yet, even when it is possible to differentiate both 
terminologies, there might not be the case that both expressions shall be applied separately 
in every circumstance. For instance, the outputs of an education system are frequently 
measured in terms of accomplishment or attainment rates of scholars of a selected age. The 
concluding outcome, however, may well be the educational qualifications of the overall 
working-age population. Additionally, the proper use of resources can be qualified as 
positive or effective as to the initial goals. Thus, this possibility shows that effectiveness and 
efficiency are not so simple to distinguish. Likewise, outputs and outcomes are often subject 
to the regulating influence of policy makers. 
However, one unique outcome may differ when analyzed under two distinct approaches: as 
we study the efficiency of education funding, the overall behavior of wages is taken as an 
exogenously given influential aspect. On other hand, for public administration analysis, 
wages represent a measurement or determinant of efficiency. The level of outcome 
aggregation also plays an important role while policy makers are relying on consolidated 
results so they can move on with their decisions. This component also influences how the 
results are handled; whether they are interpreted as exogenously given or under control of 
administrators. The more grouped the results are, the higher the chance for unrevealed 
inefficient outcomes. In contrast, this applies to the cases where a more detailed 
comprehension of how inter-sector drivers work such a combinations of inputs within the 
utilization of an item (e.g. allocation of funds). Thus, delimiting the concept of effectiveness 
and efficiency is not trivial.  While estimating the level of efficiency, one should be able to 
distinguish between technical and allocative efficiency (MANDL, DIERX, & ILZKOVITZ, 2008; 
PERMAN, MA, Mc GILVRAY, & COMMON, 1996). Technical efficiency estimates the behavior 
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between inputs and outputs considering the production possibility frontier.  Technical 
efficiency achievements are steps towards this “best practice” (production possibility 
frontier). However, not every form of technical efficiency makes economic sense, and this is 
captured by distributive efficiency, which introduces costs and benefits (PERMAN, MA, Mc 
GILVRAY, & COMMON, 1996; MANDL, DIERX, & ILZKOVITZ, 2008).  
Distributional efficiency depicts the relationship between the combination of inputs in a 
cost-benefit approach and the output attained. For example, to instruct pupils, there is a mix 
of resources necessary, such as teachers, books and facilities. The success of this experience 
could be maximized by an optimal combination of these inputs. Thus, the measurement of 
distributional efficiency demands in-depth analyses of the field to study.  
High level of efficiency, from an individual scale, attained by a single input can not be directly 
translated into high public and collective levels of output when alternative solutions can 
attain better results.. A result that is considered efficient by an individual does not 
necessarily reflect efficiency as we look into the overall expectations of public service 
responsibilities. Parallel combination of inputs can lead to more rewarding outputs. 
Other challenges around assessing efficiency are the situations where services provided by 
public actors, thus their outputs, may be used as inputs by other public agents. This makes 
the exercise of differentiating effectiveness and efficiency of gains resulted by the utilization 
of inputs and outputs. A suitable example is the increased offer of public transportation 
system as a result of investment in infrastructure. The allocation of financial resources in one 
service may affect the investments in education, which is expected to reduce its quality as 
whole. Contrary to the private sector, the public sector cannot simply be analyzed upon a 
direct input – output relationship (MANDL, DIERX, & ILZKOVITZ, 2008). 
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3.3-  The Rondônia’s ICMS-E Schedule: a simple case 
The ICMS-E calculation schedule of the Paraná state is considered quite sophisticated when 
compared to other federative member’s indexes and ICMS-E policy schemes.  Nevertheless, 
for the sake of simplicity, a handy intuitive example of how the ICMS-E can be much more 
comprehensive in its form is the Rondônia case (GRIEG-GRAN, 2000). If we accept this 
attempt as a mere introductory presentation, quite out of this project’s scope, we shall see 
that the calculation of the Rondônia’s ICMS-E is much more straight-forward than Paraná’s 
and Mato Grosso’s:  
(16)      
    
   
 
Where     is the ecological index of county i and      denotes the conservation factor of 
county i . The index      is the result of the factor  
             
           
.                depicts the 
total area of conservation units in county i in hectares. The area of county i is denoted by 
            . Furthermore, the denominator     (the State Conservation Factor) is 
equivalent to the sum of all Municipal Coefficient Factors, and is represented by aggregated 
coefficient factor ∑    . Is there an optimal solution where the policy is efficient for all? 
Where     is the marginal rate of transformation for land, and      is the marginal rate 
for transformation for capital. In order to achieve economic efficiency, we still need to 
achieve the following necessary conditions:               
        . In short, 
all marginal rates of transformation and all marginal rates of utility substitution must be 
equivalent. Although these conditions are rather conceptual, as to the scope of this 
empirical academic study, the claim that a fiscal policy needs to observe these assumptions, 
in order to be considered an efficient compensational mechanism, is an orientation. Since, 
it’s possible to observe distributional discrepancies in the consumption patterns followed by 
the allocations in Mato Grosso, a fully-efficient-outcome does not seem being achieved. This 
is, however, only an assessment based on a single microeconomic approach. The overall 
analysis of the Ecological ICMS as a compensatory transfer, in reality, is far more complex 
due to the problem’s environmental, financial, political and macroeconomic dimensions 
(AZZONI & ISAIB, 1994; NETO, 2008; MEDEIROS, YOUNG, C.E.F., & PAVESE, 2011).  
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4- Methodology and Data Analysis 
 
The research project will be divided into three phases. I’ve started it by reviewing the history 
of impacts of ICMS-E in Paraná and Mato Grosso. Initially, it is important to understand the 
legal characteristics as to the application of this environmental compensation. To what 
extent is there compliance of the municipalities and the state with the current legislation? 
Ring (2007) & Börner et al. (2009) suggest that without having an outlook of the legal 
settings, a lot of the contextual binding commitments of local and state authorities would 
not be well-defined.  
The next step in this research is consisted of collecting data about the finances of the state 
and its municipalities. Much of the financial analysis will consider the revenue generated 
with the ICMS-E both in Paraná and Mato Grosso. These public finance records are expected 
to show how the state has been investing and transferring its tax revenue. In Mato Grosso, 
as to 2009, around 38% of the total number of municipalities was not being granted with the 
tax transfers of the program. In six years, from 2002 to 2009, 17 municipalities joined the 
ICMS-E program, which corresponds to an increase of 25% as to the initial base. As a result, 
the number of Protected Areas increased only 26% in that period. As to 2012, the number of 
municipalities using the incentive seems to have stabilized around 60% of the state’s total. 
One of the steps of my objective is to investigate the logic behind the constrains of the 
ICMS-E in Mato Grosso. Conflicting economic activities, whether they are private or public, 
could be impacting local level political decisions. The research will try to disclose as many as 
of evidences regarding the factors that either block or foster all municipalities of receiving 
the benefits from the state. This part of the research will be quite concentrated on the 
history of financial reports. In a counter-point, we will over-see the returns, in a quantifiable 
fashion, for each municipality that is being granted with the program and confront with 
those that are not being.  
In a more qualitative approach, I shall attempt to revise the structure of local policies and try 
to find whether local policy makers have been committed in terms of, not only attaining the 
revenue through the ICMS-E, but also in promoting biodiversity conservation; e.g: are there 
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evidences as to how efficient the budget has been earmarked back to sustainable 
determinants? 
The second phase of the analysis consists of data analysis and hypothesis testing. This stage 
is divided into the following approaches: first; the evolution of the behavior and 
characteristics of the ICMS-E’s distribution is analyzed specially during the years between 
2002 and 2009. In other hand, I also try to disclose information about the history 
deforestation levels in Mato Grosso. Through 2001 and 2007, the aggregated average 
deforestation level has achieved 8,6% in 2004, against 0,56% of 2007. Therefore, it is 
necessary to investigate what may have be influential drivers in this drastic reduction of 
forest damage. Next, I provide an analysis on the bivariate correlation on the performances 
of members and non-members of ICMS-E as a fiscal policy. The hypothesis is that extra 
financing has improved the quality of a social service that can be regarded both as a 
development and environmental determinant (MANDL, DIERX, & ILZKOVITZ, 2008; 
EHRHARDT-MARTINEZ, 1998). This is the case of the the IDEB and Prova Brasil indexes. 
These two indicators apply standardized and methodological criterion throughout Brazil and 
have been considered a breakthrough in the recent Brazilian Education Plan to reduce 
inequality. Although, it’s clear that reinvestment of the financial resources in core biological 
services is preferred by environmentalists and biologists, improvement of the social welfare 
function of the fiscal transfer can, nevertheless, improve protection through ecological 
awareness, for instance. Higher GDP per capta has also proved to be an effective 
determinant in diminishing levels of deforestation. Moreover, I seek to understand the 
dependence, if there is any, between the financing of local public municipal schools and the 
improvement of the student’s performance measured in the “Prova Brasil”. This is to test the 
relationship between the evolution of the elementary school indexes (data available 
between 2005 and 2009) by each municipality and the effect of their extra revenue share if 
the recipients are members of the program. This result is also confronted with the 
performance of education in municipalities that do not receive the PES (Payment for 
Ecological Services) (MEC - Ministério da Educacão, 2012; IBGE, 2011; EWERS, 2005). 
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Then, the test runs the model’s covariance matrix with the following definitions. 
1. Model to be tested: 
 
                          
                               
              
Where: 
a)    = is the quality of elementary education as a result of financing and investment in 
local municipal schools. 
 
b)      = area of the municipality “i”. Municipalities with bigger areas have joined the 
ICMS-E program more than municipalities with less territory. Thus, it indicates the 
municipalities participating in the PES are actually receiving a share that should be 
also distributed to smaller district, which promotes an unfair distributional effect. 
 
c)         
     = is the deforestation rate measured in each municipality “i” between 2001 
and 2007.  
 
d)      = is the ICMS received, by the municipality “i” in period “t”, through the added-
value fiscal revenue (measured in Brazilian Reais); the higher is ICMS received 
through it is added-value criteria, the higher is its economic activity, the less area is 
being protected (FERNANDES et al 2011). It has to be analyzed as to the local 
characteristics. ICMS (Imposto sobre Comercializacão de Mercadorias e Servicos). 
 
e)                  
         = is the change, or improvement, of an index based on a 
complementary evaluation provided by the “Sistema Nacional de Avaliação da 
Educação Básica (Saeb)” and one of the components of the IDEB, Elementary 
Education’s Development index (Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica). It’s 
assessed through the examination of two basis disciplines: Portuguese and 
Mathematics. The Prova Brasil index was launched in 2005. It is considered as a 
major Brazilian federal measurement towards performance in public education. 
 
f)    = denotes any possible dummy variable. In the test presented here, this 
independent variable is not being applied. 
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Recent Trends and Drivers of Deforestation and Degradation in Mato Grosso 
 
As we can see on the map, page 73 (figure 18), the Mato Grosso covers three different 
Biomes: The Amazon Forest (Floresta), The Cerrado and The Pantanal. A good sample for a 
distributional analysis as to the municipalities should take into account the aspects of the 
spatial characteristics of the ground. The type of coverage is an important aspect when we 
consider the motivation for local conservational policies. According to SEMA-MT 
Deforestation in Mato Grosso is higher in the Cerrado.  
 
Figure 3. Deforestation in Mato Grosso from 2001 to 2007 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Source: SEMA-MT and own calculations. 
 
Although recent reports show important decline in forest depletion rates, open access in 
Mato Grosso has facilitated illegal occupation and logging activities, which accounts for the 
first stage of deforestation. These activities are concentrated mainly within the so called Arc 
of Deforestation; a stretch that extends from Pará to its southern boundaries along 
Tocantins, Mato Grosso, Rondônia and Acre states (see figure 13). These new occupation 
patterns have determined the structuring of that region’s economic development. Illegally 
occupied lands have even worked as collateral to finance later clear-cutting for other land 
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uses. It has also reshaped the social structures within those areas. Paving and construction 
of new roads are considered influential drivers in the deforestation trend of the past decade. 
The Cuiabá-Porto Velho highway (BR-364), linking the capitals of Mato Grosso and Rondônia 
states, is a good example of infrastructure building-up pressures in a region facing serious 
conservation challenges. The road is part of a major production flow scheme connecting 
Santarém in Amazon, where a new soybean cropping pole has rose. (CIFOR, 2010) 
 
Figure 4. Observations of deforestation rate* and the ICMS-E membership in Mato Grosso: 
 
 
Figure 4 
Source: SEMA-MT and *own calculations. 
In the graphic above, figure 4, I split the set of the total number of municipalities into the 
groups that have recurrently received the financial benefits (87 observations) of 
conservation unities and the cities that are not members (52 observations). Clearly, it is 
possible to identify that the rates of deforestation23 of these two groups differ significantly. 
As expected, the group that is not enrolled in ICMS-S program displays, in average, a higher 
rate of deforestation. However, the histogram above introduces a coarse analysis of the 
Mato Grosso’s deforestation paths. Moreover, we should be able to observe if there are 
distortionary or spill-over effects caused by the implementation of this policy, as to the 
                                                          
23
 *The rate of deforestation used is the ratio of the deforested area divided by the municipality’s total area. 
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different municipalities spread over the three major biomes of Mato Grosso; E.g: Does the  
sense of protection towards the Conservation Unities increase production in areas not 
protected? However, in order to analyze the effectiveness of the Ecological ICMS as a whole, 
it is crucial to understand the development of the outcomes achieved by this environmental 
policy and the level of biodiversity protection over time. Although, the absolute 
deforestation levels have decreased through the past decade, the relative rate of 
deforestation remains high (see figure 18, page 73) and imposes a challenge to policy 
makers (SEMA-MT, 2011).  
Have areas of preservation increased with the tax credit?  
 
Figure 5 
Source: IPEA and own calculations. 
In the figure above, we see that the aggregated area’s protected surface, measured in 
hectares, has augmented considerably after the Ecological ICMS. After 2000, year of the 
implementation of the legislation, these changes in Mato Grosso show an increase of 176% 
in the state’s conservation unities and 236% in federal protected areas. This scenario 
contradicts one of the most discouraging assumptions about the Conservation Unities. That 
is, their marginal increase in revenue does not follow the marginal changes in augmented 
area. In Mato Grosso, it is evidenced, by all different sources of data, that it is not the case. 
Furthermore, the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro’s Research Group for Environmental 
Economics  (Grupo de Pesquisa em Economia do Meio Ambiente IE/UFRJ) has carried out an 
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important economic research to determine the net benefits of the preservation promoted 
by  Conservation Unities (MEDEIROS et al. 2011). The idea is that augmented protected 
areas show positive correlation with enhanced green services, such as eco-tourism, for 
instance. Although private entrepreneurship certainly needs further investigation, in this 
study, I try to approach it coarsely, at most. Indeed, this research’s objective is to introduce 
the social implications and changes in welfare as a response of the environmental 
protection. But, if sustainable development is kept as an ultimate goal, we also need to 
position the Conservation Unities under the perspectives set by the concepts of 
development, either it is social, environmental or economic. The policy, therefore, has far 
more likelihood to be successfully implemented if nature and society concomitantly gains 
with the restrictive changes proposed by regulators in this fiscal federalist model.  
 
Figure 6 
Source: IPEA and own calculations. 
The positive outcome observed in Mato Grosso can also be observed in Paraná. After the 
year that the state law was implemented, through their pioneering legislation, the quantity 
of municipal conservation unities increased considerably. They have increased as much as 
602% within a period no longer than 20 years. Although this increase in area sounds 
remarkable, it is important to take into account that it represents a relative improvement 
since the initial base of evaluation was low. Nevertheless, the increase is significant and 
shows definitively an important change towards conservation of fully protected areas in the 
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state. The ratios of increased protected surfaces, both in the state and municipal cases, 
show similar patterns as opposed to the 130% of the federal increase. But, interestingly, the 
increase of state protected areas is higher than the federal unities. This outcome differs 
from what we find in Mato Grosso. The reason is quite obvious, if we take into account that 
the Mato Grosso state lies on the stretch widely known as Deforestation Arch in the Legal 
Amazon. This is a region where the federal command-and-control policies, against 
deforestation, play a significant and decisive role. Is the rate of deforestation higher, equal 
or less than the one observed in municipalities that haven’t joined the Ecological ICMS 
program? 
 
Figure 7 
Source: INPE and *own calculations. 
The municipalities analyzed in the figure above are separated into two groups; the receptors 
of ICMS-E and non-receptors. I have preferably labeled them as members throughout this 
study. The number of municipalities under the 1% deforestation rate threshold accounts 
85% for the ICMS-E members against 71% of non-members. This is a vital finding in this 
project. Without an important contribution provided by the mechanism, in quantitative 
environmental terms, all other assumptions, whether they were factious or hypothetical, 
would naturally be considered rather under subjective scrutiny (see table 8). Expectedly, the 
deforestation rate in the municipalities within the ICMS-E is lower than the ones without; 
average of 0,56% against 0,77% respectively. However, the scenario is not static. There is an 
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increasing number of municipalities that have filed for the state and federal analysis on new 
protected areas. Those applications are currently waiting for the licensing procedures and 
necessary documentation. The municipalities that haven’t joined the program, up to date, 
are generally smaller in territorial size than the ones receiving the fiscal transfers. In figure 7, 
we can see the aggregated deforestation rate analyzed from 2001 to 2007. The continuous 
trend-line depicts the observations regarding municipalities not participating in the 
Ecological ICMS, while the dashed line depicts the member’s. 
 
Figure 8 
Source: SEMA-MT, INPE and *own calculations. 
An important indicator of the cost-effectiveness to the ecological ICMS can be perceived in 
the scatter plot above. As to 2007, we can observe the inverse relationship of the per person 
paid compensation rate as to 86 municipalities. Within the observations in figure 8, 
municipalities protecting more area also attain a higher return in overall reduced 
deforestation. In other words, the deforestation registered in open access areas, combined 
with restricted areas, tends to diminish. In this case, clearly, the money spent on 
conservation unities would be already worthy if deforestation rates could be kept constant. 
However, as matter of fact, for each monetary unit paid, there is a gain in terms of 
environmental value. In average, the deforestation rate was as high as 0,62% for 
municipalities paying a monetary compensation per capta close to zero; in other hand, 
municipalities paying R$26,95 per inhabitant would have, most likely, achieved a natural 
forest degradation rate as low as 0,32%.    
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Figure 9 
Source: SEMA-MT and own calculations. 
In figure 9, both the states of Paraná and Mato Grosso contradict the hypothesis that an 
increased number of municipalities cause diminishing returns to the members. It hasn’t 
proved so in this investigation, nor does it keep the gains at same levels of the rate of 
change as to members entering the compensational policy. In the Paraná, the total ICMS-E 
increased 105% as from 2002 to 2009 (not discounted inflation). With the discounted 
accumulated inflation in the period (2002-2009) of 63,71%24, the transfer would have valued 
over 75 million Brazilian Reais back in 2002. In Mato Grosso, this gain was even higher with 
an improvement of 140%. When the inflation in the same period is discounted, the amount 
transferred to the state in 2009 accounts for over 33 million reais; back in 2002. Thus, taken 
the inflation as discounted, both states increased their compensations as much as 25,6% and 
46,6%, respectively. The analysis has showed quite a steady growth in terms of payments 
received by the members. Literature, up to date, has obviously addressed the ecological 
ICMS with the deserved skepticism of any investigation. Much of this questioning regards 
the ability of the policy to achieve constant or increased returns to scale. This concern led 
even authors to use the term “zero-sum-game-policy”; a metaphor to explain the counter-
                                                          
24
 The inflation index used to this discounting simulation is the IGP-DI (2002-2009) measured by the FGV 
(Fundacão Getúlio Vargas) and reported by IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada). It can be formaly 
expressed such as: ∫           
    
    
 ; is the discounted present value and where r is the compounded interest 
rate and K(2002) is the capital (Brazilian Reais) rate at beginning of the period. 
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effect of the increased base of the fiscal transfer’s receptors. The Minas Gerais and São 
Paulo cases are good illustrations of how this effect may take place. The incremental share 
of the ICMS-E was not enough to overcome the effects of the enlarged quantity of members 
and the monetary consequences of capital devaluation. My own assumption, as far as this 
study goes, is that the weights of these states’ allocation indexes are too weak to 
compensate changes occurred due to macro-economic circumstances. This loss of 
compensation strength seems to casually impact the financial outcomes of the sums 
transferred to the municipalities. That is the scenario in São Paulo, where the allocation 
criterion rewards merely 0.5% of the total ICMS, and in Minas Gerais, where the allocation 
criterion recompenses just 1%. Moving ahead, what to expect next in Paraná and Mato 
Grosso? Since roughly 60% of the municipalities have already joined the program as to 2012, 
in both states, the effects caused by the addition of new entrants are expected to be only 
marginal. Even if there are minor short-run constrains, in the long-run, economic growth 
tends to eventually off-set current losses. This implies that municipalities could have more 
flexibility to plan their budgeting accordingly.  
 
Figure 10 
Source: IPEA, IBGE, SEMA-MT and own calculations.*(million). 
Figure 10 shows the evolution of the GDP and ecological ICMS in both states. It’s clear that, 
despite two states that have implemented the compensation to the municipalities at 
different points in time, based on different set of laws, not to mention the political aspects 
involved, and with distinct patterns of economic activities, present so similar growth paths. A 
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feasible hypothesis would be that since the source of capital stock is the ICMS (added-value 
tax), a fiscal policy based on commercial and industrial performance, the impact caused by 
the influences of economic growth is inevitable, thus, generating a positive effect  on the 
ICMS-E. 
Regression Model – Expected Ecological ICMS. 
Data Analysis 
In this test, I run an OLS (Ordinary Least Square) model, widely applied in Social Sciences, to 
determine the impact of drivers that may interfere in the results achieved with the 
ecological ICMS (WATSON, 2007). The objective is to identify potential outcomes as to the 
rate of change in the expected value of the ecological ICMS for each of the receptors. The 
most important goal is, in fact, to identify whether changes in education patterns provided 
by the measurements of the education quality recently implemented in Brazil, in a federal 
level, are relevant outcomes with the conservation unity’s context. The performance index, 
named Prova Brasil, is isolated from the biannual data report of the MEC (Brazilian Ministry 
of Education). From which I could extract the performance of the public schools financed 
strictly, under jurisdiction terms, by the municipal budget. The first release was in the year of 
2005 and the last available release is 2009. The examination’s index results are filtered 
according to the following specifications: Ensino Fundamental Regular - Séries Finais-5ª a 8ª 
série; Recalculado em Junho de 2011; Prova Brasil -Nota Média Padronizada (N); Rede 
Municipal. The index expresses the means of the grades achieved by students, in elementary 
scholar years, in standardized methodological examinations in Portuguese and Mathematics. 
First, I tested for the bivariate correlation of independent and independent variable. Their 
relationships have showed a consistent parallel within previous expectations mentioned in 
the explained covariance matrix. Furthermore, all tests used a 95% confidence interval. The 
data used relies on five major determinants. The area of the conservation unities is provided 
by annual accounting reports released by the Environmental Department of Mato Grosso 
(Memória de Cálculo do ICMS-E).  The larger is the area, the higher is the expected value by 
each municipality, but this number is corrected by other coefficients; i.e.: the ICMS (value-
added tax generated in each municipality). Although the complete universe of municipalities 
includes 141 municipalities, I have only considered the ones that provide municipal 
education to the local population. In total, they comprehend 94 municipalities, all from 
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which 65 received the fiscal incentive and 29 are not enrolled in the program.  Checking for 
the reduction on the uncertainties provided by the original data, we can see that it has 
reasonably returned with an R2 of 0,32. Although this result has been enhanced in other 
tests, I stick to the variables used here due to their literal and contextual relevance. 
Although GDP per capta is an index commonly used in studies on land coverage and changes 
in natural forest patterns, I use the ICMS-E per capta in order to capture the distributional 
influences of this municipal outcome in my set of parameters. 
Result Analysis 
a) Test 1: Dependent Variable ICMS-E and independent variables with no treatment. 
Regression Statistics           
Multiple R 0,57           
R Square 0,32           
Adjusted R Square 0,29           
Standard Error 537001,62           
Observations 94           
              
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 378332,73 138569,85 2,73 0,01 102997,40 653668,07 
Area CU 0,36 0,06 6,28 <0,001 0,24 0,47 
Def. Rate -766348,70 1109405,59 -0,69 0,49 -970713,96 1438016,57 
Melhor. P.Brasil 56370,84 103000,79 0,55 0,59 -148289,53 261031,22 
ICMS 0,00 0,00 0,20 0,84 -0,01 0,01 
 
b) Test 2: Dependent Variable ICMS-E  and Log 10 transformation for the independent variables 
Area CU and ICMS (added-value tax) 
Regression Statistics 
     
Multiple R 0,66 
     R Square 0,44 
     Adjusted R Square 0,42 
     Standard Error 486004,82 
     
Observations 94 
     
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 1215549,07 897519,09 1,35 0,18 -567802,25 2998900,39 
Log10 Area CU 183790,72 22651,74 8,11 <0,001 138782,19 228799,25 
Def. Rate 1304364,19 1001609,42 -1,30 0,20 3294540,78 685812,40 
Melhor. P.Brasil 18347,67 95114,68 0,19 0,85 -170643,17 207338,50 
Log10 ICMS -188784,45 135723,17 -1,39 0,17 -458463,50 80894,59 
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       In both cases, it is important to see that the “Melhor Prova Brasil” (changes in performance, 
either improvement or decay) is a positively relevant, although not determinant, parameter 
in the composition of the expected transfers. These findings support evidences showing that 
more robust municipal capitalization, capable of minimizing financial burden, such as cash 
flow management, have an impact on social welfare, or at least, on welfare services. 
Municipalities that are not members of the Ecological ICMS-E finance their educational 
expenses with the regular annual budget calculated upon their fiscal revenue. Thus, the 
value within the ICMS-E received is zero. The relationship between the ICMS-E and area is 
clear. Conservations unities in Mato Grosso attain their index based on the classification of 
the unities by the territorial surface (national parks, indigenous land, biological reserve, etc.) 
as opposed to Paraná, where the quality indicator plays a bigger weight than the area itself. 
Likewise, the deforestation rates are expected to be reduced when the conservational and 
economic factors are positively correlated (EWERS, 2005). That is, municipalities with higher 
per capta income, depicted here through the ICMS-E per capta, combined with higher GDP 
(depicted here through the Added-Value activity) tends to reduce negative forest changes 
and/or increase forest coverage. Note that a more elaborated analysis would possibly take 
other factors into account such as inequality levels, industrial stress, modernization and etc. 
In the second test, it follows that, in order to correct the skewness and kurtosis effects on 
the distributions as to the municipality’s areas in hectares and ICMS (tha added-value 
revenue), I use a log transformation of these independent variables. This returns a higher R2 
with a reduced t-stat as to the intercept. Ideally, we should be looking for a t-stat equivalent 
or superior to 1,99, for two-sided distribution with 5% significance level, given the sample 
size and the confidence intervals. However, the significance probability in both tests show 
important responses in the “Melhor Prova Brasil” parameter. That is, the null hypothesis 
should not be rejected. Both regression tests return 89 residuals and 4 perfect linear fits 
(WATSON, 2007).  
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5- Conclusion 
 
Considering the state level extension of this PES mechanism, any new finding would make 
more sense if critical questions in the literature, few of which unsolved, could be examined 
in Mato Grosso. This has a reason. Mato Grosso is a strategic territory covering three 
different biomes (all presenting high levels of biodiversity), one of which is the Amazon 
forest, and under intensified industrial and agricultural stress. Thus, passing the test there 
can eventually be considered a credential for the ICMS-E as an environmental policy. As to 
this regard, the improvement of welfare levels was a central concern of this study, right from 
the beginning. The importance of this point was, for instance, evidenced through the 
commitment of several communities adopting this pioneering strategy to solve for their 
environmental challenges, where not so seldom, relative inequality levels are high and social 
indicators are low. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that the social trends 
play a role in the final result of this PES mechanism. Intrinsically, the question is indeed what 
drivers are weightier. Given that the priorities of the local public decision-makers must be 
determined based on “vis-à-vis” and “door-to-door” political negotiations, the reinvestment 
of financial resources, purely into ecology, is not likely to take place without any binding 
jurisdiction. This, however, might not be exactly considered a tragedy, even in the extreme 
cases, where environmental concerns are factiously set aside. In Brazil, the institutional and 
legal framework (in the municipal, state and federal levels and in all three federative 
powers) strictly determines that the public budget, for the subsequent fiscal year, must be 
planned and approved ahead; the well-known “Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal” (Fiscal 
Responsibility Law). So, it’s imperative to shed light on the transparency25 of the local 
budgets, key components of ecological ICMS-E compensations. Thereafter, demonstrating 
the features of the financial (quantitative) relationship between capital and public welfare 
spending is quite straight forward; the doubts are raised, nevertheless, when we look rather 
into the efficiency and effectiveness aspects of these payments. Moving ahead, the study 
                                                          
25
 The “Lei de Acesso à Informacão” (Information Access Law), “Lei Federal nº 12.527”, passed on May, 16th of 
2012, safeguards full and unrestricted access to any public information in all federative levels and powers 
(Brazilian Government, 2012). 
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has also verified that regional economic growth has an important influence in the financial 
outcomes of the program. A positive trend here guarantees that the current and future 
attractiveness of this PES strategy by the municipalities, and moreover, by country-level 
policy makers, is preserved. This perception has been well documented in the up-to-date 
literature. From the data analysis, in Mato Grosso, the figures show that the state’s 
economic growth has rewarded the ICMS-E stakeholders. Even with new members being 
added into the calculation base, the amounts have not diminished since the ICMS-E 
implementation. This has also been the case in Paraná, for instance, where the weight of the 
conservation factor, in face of the allocation criteria, allows first: an increasing compensation 
level over time; and second: a reduced exposure of the transfers, from the state perspective, 
as to exogenous effects of the Brazilian economy. Thus, if economic activity is not conflicting 
with environmental objectives, then, economic growth (i.e. either through increase in 
productivity and/or improvement of technologies) has a positive effect on the ICMS-E 
compensation and on reducing non-beneficial off-setting. Deforestation rates in 
municipalities, eligible to the compensation, are lower than in those not participating in the 
program between 2001 and 2007. Another important indicator, fire incidents have been 
more intense in regions with open access but, whatsoever, not strict to them. Evidencing 
this conclusion, the spatial forest burning analysis is a good bird’s eye view. It leads to the 
comprehension that the logic of obstructing access to areas might not be sufficient to 
completely halt deforestation inside the conservation unities. However, the ICMS-E certainly 
encourages biodiversity protection through environmental awareness and community 
engagement; an outcome widely discussed in previous investigations as well. The 
combination of these factors, often inseparable, needs to be further analyzed. In the 
municipalities where there are ICMS-E transfers, financing of municipal public schools shows 
modest, but relevant, relationship with the improvement of education. My hypothesis is that 
the ICMS-E is an important financial inflow, not just augmenting the budget, but also 
alleviating eventual cash flow burdens in those communities. At last, within the limited 
scope of this project, it’s not clear that the ecological ICMS can be considered an efficient 
fiscal policy, but it seems to be an effective environmental mechanism. It thoroughly 
deserves further investigation.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 11. The presence of the ecological ICMS in Brazil.  
Twelve states in Brazil have introduced the ecological ICMS that redistributes part of their state 
value-added tax income back to municipalities based on “Conservation Units” system. 
 
 
 
Figure 11 
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Figure 12: Occupied areas and diversity of actor and activities (IBGE, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 12 
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Figure 13  
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Figure 14. Illustration of a multi-tiered policy impact assessment framework (NINA - Norwegian 
Institute for Natural Research, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 14 
 “A multi-tiered policy impact assessment framework needs to address interaction across instruments 
due to common governance structures of apparently alternative instrument; be robust to correlation 
across assessment criteria due to spatial interactions (externalities) between land-uses that are 
subject to policy mixes. Case-based, rather than theory-driven assessment assumes that experiences 
on the ground determine policy design at higher governance levels”. 
(RING I. e., Assessing the role of economic instruments in a policy mix for biodiversity conservation 
and ecosystem services provision: A review of some methodological challenges, 2010) 
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Figure 15. A multi-tier and multi-scale framework for analysing the impacts of economic 
instruments in policy mixes on social-ecological systems (RING I. e., Assessing the role of economic 
instruments in a policy mix for biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services provision: A review 
of some methodological challenges, 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 15 
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Figure 16. Instruments, administration’s jurisdiction and land limits (private and public): 
Different economic instruments play different complementary roles across the same landscape, 
given the configuration of overlapping forest resource, use and governance characteristics. The role 
of economic valuation is to quantify the externalities (which happens, by definition, across 
governance interfaces) (POLICIMIX, 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 16 
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Figure 17. Forest transition stages and policy examples at each stage26.  
“Research has tended to focus on policies causing changes in forest cover. Part of the policy mix in 
stage 1 and stage 3 is avoiding policy and institutional failure of stage 2”. (NINA, 2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 17 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
26 Adapted from Angelsen (2007), Wunder (2003), García-Fernández et al. (2008) and Barbier et al. (2010).  
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Figure 18: Land Coverage by Biome and Deforestation in Mato Groso: 1999 – 2007 
 
 
Figure 18 
  
    Biome Area Ha. Deforest. Ha. % Def.* 
Cerrado 35.484.347,87 16.484.926,17 46,46% 
Floresta 48.021.598,83 16.398.466,39 34,15% 
Pantanal 6.088.501,91 1.404.590,89 23,07% 
  89.594.448,61 34.287.983,45 38,27% 
 
Source: SEMA-MT and  
*own calculations 
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Figure 19. Classification of selective timber extraction. 
 
 
Figure 19 
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Table 1. Ecological ICMS transferred in 2009 per Federative Stare and contribution by each 
Conservation Unity criteria indicator. 
Table 1 
State 
Maximun Perct. 
Allocated to ICMS-E 
CU Factor 
Coefficient 
Transfer of ICMS-E in 2009 
(Millions of Br R$) 
Total Value of the 
ICMS-E generated 
by the CU criteria 
(Million of R$) 
Acre 5% 5% 
 
1,5 
Amapá 1% 1% 1,0 1 
Mato Grosso 5% 5% 55,4 68,4 
Mato Grosso do Sul  5% 5% 39,4 39,5 
Minas Gerais 1% 1% 45,4 22,7 
Paraná  5% 3% 124,1 62,1 
Pernambuco 15% 1% 
 
13,5 
Rio de Janeiro 3% 1% 37,9 17,1 
Rondônia 5% 5% 90,7 90,7 
São Paulo 1% 1% 78,2 78,2 
Tocantins 13% 4% 29,7 8 
  
Total 501,8 402,7 
 
Table 2 
Figure13. Ecological ICMS paid to Municipalities, per capta and share in the State Budget, 2009. 
State 
Population 
2009 
CU 
Coefficient 
ICMS-E Per 
Capta 
Total Value of 
the ICMS-E by 
the CU criteria 
(Million of R$)* 
State 
Revenue* 
ICMS-E CU 
criteria/ State 
Budget (%) 
Acre 691.132 5% 2,1 1,5 821 0,18% 
Amapá 618.807 1% 1,6 1 583 0,17% 
Mato Grosso 2.915.428 5% 23,5 68,4 4.464 1,53% 
Mato Grosso do Sul  2.354.467 5% 16,8 39,5 4.312 0,92% 
Minas Gerais 19.798.130 1% 1,1 22,7 26.836 0,08% 
Paraná  10.633.373 3% 5,8 62,1 15.504 0,40% 
Pernambuco 8.755.159 1% 1,5 13,5 9.184 0,15% 
Rio de Janeiro 15.355.607 1% 1,1 17,1 24.780 0,07% 
Rondônia 1.503.928 5% 60,3 90,7 2.088 4,34% 
São Paulo 40.935.326 1% 1,9 78,2 77.536 0,10% 
Tocantins 1.289.526 4% 6,2 8 1.788 0,45% 
 
Source: SEMA-MT, IPEA, IBGE, INPE and own calculations.      
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Table- 3. Conservation Unity’s Category in Mato Grosso and Correction Factors. 
Table 3 
 
Source: SEMA-MT 
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Table 4. ICMS-E in Mato Grosso and Fiscal Allocation Criteria. 
 
Table 4 
 
Source: SEMA-MT 
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Table 5 
CU Areas 
               
 
População Área  Ecossistema ICMS-E 2009
 
2009 Parte do Total Referente 
   
2009 
 
2007 km2 A B S/N GDP capta AREA UC  TOTAL ICMS R$  ao ICMS Ecologico % Receita IND.UCTI 05%  INDICE FINAL ICMS-E/ Capita GDP capta 
APIACÁS 7.926 20.364 Amazônia 
 
1 17.760,87 9.426.941,12 5072885,78 2702077,60 53,27% 0,255 0,478 340,91 17.760,87 
JUINA 38.422 26.251 Cerrado Amazônia 1 11.344,18 1.620.673,36 12018493,13 2373300,36 19,75% 0,224 1,133 61,77 11.344,18 
COMODORO 17.939 21.743 Cerrado Amazônia 1 12.233,70 1.363.936,00 7357453,86 2290591,72 31,13% 0,216 0,694 127,69 12.233,70 
GAÚCHA DO  NORTE 5.816 16.899 Cerrado Amazônia 1 21.327,30 814.014,00 4695357,25 1758982,63 37,46% 0,166 0,443 302,44 21.327,30 
QUERÊNCIA 10.682 17.850 Amazônia 
 
1 44.045,53 728.820,11 9546088,76 1490929,79 15,62% 0,141 0,900 139,57 44.045,53 
ARIPUANÃ 19.100 25.049 Amazônia 
 
1 16.677,67 655.744,00 6816703,22 961028,11 14,10% 0,091 0,643 50,32 16.677,67 
PEIXOTO DE AZEVEDO 28.987 14.399 Amazônia 
 
1 7.266,32 643.898,54 4732496,03 1613184,61 34,09% 0,152 0,446 55,65 7.266,32 
TANGARÁ DA SERRA 76.657 11.566 Cerrado Amazônia 1 16.052,75 592.173,64 22051236,28 1867069,11 8,47% 0,176 2,079 24,36 16.052,75 
RONDOLÂNDIA 3.348 12.654 Amazônia 
 
1 19.575,28 589.600,00 3671695,76 1701450,30 46,34% 0,160 0,346 508,20 19.575,28 
FELIZ NATAL 10.279 11.448 Cerrado Amazônia 1 14.892,07 526.132,63 5805067,89 1678204,08 28,91% 0,158 0,547 163,27 14.892,07 
SAPEZAL 14.254 13.598 Cerrado 
 
1 90.174,27 480.829,00 19361407,46 1291247,62 6,67% 0,122 1,826 90,59 90.174,27 
COTRIGUAÇU 13.740 9.124 Amazônia 
 
1 9.035,85 425.085,00 3881081,54 1193426,79 30,75% 0,113 0,366 86,86 9.035,85 
PARANÁTINGA 20.033 24.178 Cerrado Amazônia 1 17.828,82 408.563,00 8021286,49 615494,91 7,67% 0,058 0,756 30,72 17.828,82 
COLNIZA 27.882 27.948 Amazônia 
 
1 9.471,39 374.333,00 4985712,42 507578,10 10,18% 0,048 0,470 18,20 9.471,39 
COCALINHO 5.841 16.539 Cerrado 
 
1 15.274,24 296.588,00 3513277,79 323198,99 9,20% 0,030 0,331 55,33 15.274,24 
ROSÁRIO OESTE 18.031 8.802 Cerrado 
 
1 10.997,58 281.940,77 3553852,67 334185,81 9,40% 0,032 0,335 18,53 10.997,58 
CAMPO NOVO PARECIS 22.322 9.448 Cerrado Amazônia 1 58.442,03 277.731,50 20397699,52 1073367,22 5,26% 0,101 1,923 48,09 58.442,03 
CAMPO VERDE 25.924 4.795 Cerrado 
 
1 40.939,17 277.731,50 15425550,92 27594,30 0,18% 0,003 1,455 1,06 40.939,17 
JUARA 32.023 21.387 Amazônia 
 
1 19.205,99 261.844,00 10838598,36 447055,17 4,12% 0,042 1,022 13,96 19.205,99 
SÃO FÉLIX DO ARAGUAIA 10.713 16.848 Cerrado 
 
1 14.789,55 246.611,54 3389559,47 534493,67 15,77% 0,050 0,320 49,89 14.789,55 
                20.496 16.545    23.367 1.014.660 8.756.775 1.239.223 0,19 0,12 0,83 109,37 23.366,73 
  
Winners and Losers Analysis – Grieg-Gran (2000) 
Conservation Unities in Mato Grosso (Source: SEMA-MT, IPEA, IBGE, INPE and own calculations.)     
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Table 6 
Revenue ICMS-E 
               
 
População Área  Ecossistema ICMS-E 2009
 
2009 Parte do Total Referente 
   
2009 
 
2007 km2 A B S/N GDP capta AREA UC  TOTAL ICMS R$  ao ICMS Ecologico % Receita IND.UCTI 05%  INDICE FINAL 
ICMS-E/ 
Capita GDP capta 
APIACÁS 7.926 20.364 Amazônia 
 
1 17.760,87 9.426.941,12 5072885,78 2702077,60 53,27% 0,255 0,478 340,91 17.760,87 
JUINA 38.422 26.251 Cerrado Amazônia 1 11.344,18 1.620.673,36 12018493,13 2373300,36 19,75% 0,224 1,133 61,77 11.344,18 
COMODORO 17.939 21.743 Cerrado Amazônia 1 12.233,70 1.363.936,00 7357453,86 2290591,72 31,13% 0,216 0,694 127,69 12.233,70 
NOVO SANTO ANTÔNIO 2.110 4.368 Cerrado 
 
1 7.891,89 242.486,45 3001945,52 2042285,47 68,03% 0,193 0,283 967,91 7.891,89 
ALTO BOA VISTA  5.025 2.242 Cerrado Amazônia 1 9.690,54 121.393,91 3296351,85 1977308,43 59,98% 0,186 0,311 393,49 9.690,54 
NOVA NAZARÉ 3.029 4.038 Cerrado 
 
1 9.449,51 218.515,00 3144996,84 1975696,48 62,82% 0,186 0,297 652,26 9.449,51 
TANGARÁ DA SERRA 76.657 11.566 Cerrado Amazônia 1 16.052,75 592.173,64 22051236,28 1867069,11 8,47% 0,176 2,079 24,36 16.052,75 
GAÚCHA DO  NORTE 5.816 16.899 Cerrado Amazônia 1 21.327,30 814.014,00 4695357,25 1758982,63 37,46% 0,166 0,443 302,44 21.327,30 
CONQUISTA D'OESTE 3.106 2.698 Cerrado Amazônia 1 11.633,74 128.590,72 3114581,58 1740391,99 55,88% 0,164 0,294 560,33 11.633,74 
RONDOLÂNDIA 3.348 12.654 Amazônia 
 
1 19.575,28 589.600,00 3671695,76 1701450,30 46,34% 0,160 0,346 508,20 19.575,28 
FELIZ NATAL 10.279 11.448 Cerrado Amazônia 1 14.892,07 526.132,63 5805067,89 1678204,08 28,91% 0,158 0,547 163,27 14.892,07 
PEIXOTO DE AZEVEDO 28.987 14.399 Amazônia 
 
1 7.266,32 643.898,54 4732496,03 1613184,61 34,09% 0,152 0,446 55,65 7.266,32 
QUERÊNCIA 10.682 17.850 Amazônia 
 
1 44.045,53 728.820,11 9546088,76 1490929,79 15,62% 0,141 0,900 139,57 44.045,53 
CAMPINÁPOLIS 13.666 5.970 Cerrado 
 
1 7.967,07 232.635,00 4008267,72 1422813,67 35,50% 0,134 0,378 104,11 7.967,07 
SAPEZAL 14.254 13.598 Cerrado 
 
1 90.174,27 480.829,00 19361407,46 1291247,62 6,67% 0,122 1,826 90,59 90.174,27 
COTRIGUAÇU 13.740 9.124 Amazônia 
 
1 9.035,85 425.085,00 3881081,54 1193426,79 30,75% 0,113 0,366 86,86 9.035,85 
CAMPO NOVO PARECIS 22.322 9.448 Cerrado Amazônia 1 58.442,03 277.731,50 20397699,52 1073367,22 5,26% 0,101 1,923 48,09 58.442,03 
SANTA CRUZ DO XINGU 2.116 5.625 Amazônia 
 
1 15.283,70 154.564,58 2270240,64 1003310,36 44,19% 0,095 0,214 474,15 15.283,70 
ARIPUANÃ 19.100 25.049 Amazônia 
 
1 16.677,67 655.744,00 6816703,22 961028,11 14,10% 0,091 0,643 50,32 16.677,67 
BARRA DO GARÇAS 53.243 9.142 Cerrado 
 
1 13.449,84 246.011,74 13027349,99 960699,35 7,37% 0,091 1,228 18,04 13.449,84 
                17.588 12.224    20.710 974.489 7.863.570 1.655.868 33,28% 0,16 0,74 258,50 20.709,71 
  
Winners and Losers Analysis – Grieg-Gran (2000) 
Revenue ICMS-E in Mato Grosso (Source: SEMA-MT, IPEA, IBGE, INPE and own calculations.)     
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Table 7 
Aggregated Deforestation 2001-2007 
              
                
 
População Área  Ecossistema ICMS-E 
 
2009 Parte do Total Referente 
   
2009
  
 
2007 km2 A B S/N AREA UC  TOTAL ICMS R$ ao ICMS Ecologico % Receita GDP capta Desm_1999 2001-2007 2001-2007 TOTAL TOTAL 
VERA 9.188 2.951 Cerrado Amazônia 0  3913172,36 0,00 0,00% 24.656,09 86.605,39 91808,60 31,1% 178.413,99 60,46% 
ITANHANGÁ 4.703 2.898 Amazônia 
 
0  1981826,16 0,00 0,00% 25.617,57 43.805,69 83223,85 28,7% 127.029,54 43,83% 
SINOP 105.762 3.194 Amazônia 
 
1 264,00 30088896,93 1505,91 0,01% 15.899,58 148.110,45 79138,41 24,8% 227.248,86 71,15% 
RESERVA DO CABAÇAL 2.505 371 Cerrado Amazônia 0  1183998,91 0,00 0,00% 8.979,74 31.072,38 8720,95 23,5% 39.793,32 NA 
IPIRANGA DO NORTE 4.129 3.467 Cerrado Amazônia 0  5731076,54 0,00 0,00% 73.987,51 140.784,01 80365,52 23,2% 221.149,52 63,79% 
JURUENA 8.731 3.190 Amazônia 
 
0  2204160,71 0,00 0,00% 9.532,06 54.711,08 73146,92 22,9% 127.858,00 40,08% 
CONFRESA 21.361 5.796 Cerrado Amazônia 1 26.633,00 3567161,96 167782,23 4,70% 11.033,31 208.998,14 132196,99 22,8% 341.195,13 58,87% 
TABAPORÃ 10.484 8225 Amazônia 
 
0  3572538,72 0,00 0,00% 17.911,16 153.605,86 185275,50 22,5% 338.881,35 41,20% 
VILA RICA 18.934 7.433 Cerrado Amazônia 0  4416137,29 0,00 0,00% 13.641,13 250.449,93 153552,53 20,7% 404.002,47 54,35% 
PARANÁÍTA 11.540 4.830 Amazônia 
 
0  3167574,9 0,00 0,00% 11.546,77 103.444,23 99189,25 20,5% 202.633,48 41,95% 
NOVO MUNDO 6.725 5.802 Amazônia 
 
1 169.489,60 3379124,13 695414,44 20,58% 13.980,10 134.478,26 117982,19 20,3% 252.460,46 43,51% 
PORTO DOS GAÚCHOS 6.116 7.012 Amazônia 
 
0  2689606,06 0,00 0,00% 21.103,27 136.561,03 138994,83 19,8% 275.555,86 39,30% 
SANTA CARMEM 4.319 3.920 Amazônia 
 
0  2743850,85 0,00 0,00% 39.983,14 63.304,88 73760,57 18,8% 137.065,46 34,97% 
SANTA RITA DO TRIVELATO 2.478 3.345 Cerrado 
 
1 47.770,25 3972815,08 148990,11 3,75% 98.890,75 176.346,14 59994,37 17,9% 236.340,51 70,65% 
NOVA BANDEIRANTES 12.742 9.531 Amazônia 
 
1 62.640,69 3605615,82 239832,82 6,65% 13.677,21 130.598,89 162445,70 17,0% 293.044,58 30,75% 
ALTO BOA VISTA  5.025 2.242 Cerrado Amazônia 1 121.393,91 3296351,85 1977308,43 59,98% 9.690,54 80.238,58 38124,79 17,0% 118.363,37 52,79% 
VÁRZEA GRANDE 230.307 938 Cerrado Pantanal 1 4.979,00 49172707,13 55379,48 0,11% 12.498,42 30.454,76 14244,53 15,2% 44.699,29 47,65% 
SÃO JOSÉ DO RIO CLARO 17.345 5.058 Cerrado Amazônia 0  6311967,26 0,00 0,00% 14.513,86 144.753,59 76727,74 15,2% 221.481,33 NA 
CASTANHEIRA 7.808 3.949 Amazônia 
 
0  2356194,47 0,00 0,00% 11.842,22 166.176,78 58904,76 14,9% 225.081,55 57,00% 
CANABRAVA DO NORTE 5.337 3.450 Cerrado Amazônia 0  1881640,44 0,00 0,00% 11.016,00 131.769,74 50712,52 14,7% 182.482,27 52,89% 
                24.777 4.380 61.881 6.961.820,88 164.310,67 4,79% 23.000,02 120.813,49 88.925,53 20,58% 209.739,02 50,29% 
  
Winners and Losers Analysis – Grieg-Gran (2000) 
Deforestation Rate in Mato Grosso (Source: SEMA-MT, IPEA, IBGE, INPE and own calculations.)     
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2009 
 
2009 
     
Commitment 2009 
Mean by Groups GDP capta CU AREA 
TOTAL ICMS 
R$ 
Ecological 
ICMS % Receita 
IND.UCTI 
05% Final Index 
ICMS-E/ 
Capita Index GDP capta 
           Non ICMS-E Mean 18.371,06 0 3655637,605 0 0 0 0,34 0 0 18.371,06 
           ICMS-E Mean 20.895,08 297.007,95 9.920.676,82 609.484,66 13,53% 0,06 0,94 88,03 1,94% 20.895,08 
           State Mean 19.928,44 297008 7.521.300,10 376.065,00 8,35% 0,04 0,71 54,32 1,20% 19.928,44 
                      
     
Rate of 
Desf. 
Rate of 
Desf. Rate of Desf. 
 
Rate of Desf. 
 Mean by Groups Desm_1999 Desm_2001 Desm_2007 2001-2007 2001-2007 2001 2007 TOTAL TOTAL 
 
           Non ICMS-E Mean 115.162,87 6472,258 2.408,50 38.577,88 11,32% 0,48% 0,77% 153.740,74 61,33% 
 
           ICMS-E Mean 223.044,97 10.916,39 5.018,44 72.711,79 8,57% 0,46% 0,56% 295.756,76 43,19% 
 
           State Mean 181.728,42 9.221,86 4.018,89 59.639,23 9,62% 0,47% 0,64% 241.367,65 50,14% 
 
           Source: SEMA MT/IBGE/INPE/ 
         *Own Calclulations 
                    
Table 8 
 
  
X-Ray of the ICMS-E: Paraná x Mato Grosso   
   2009 Paraná - PR Mato Grosso - MT 
Area Sq. Km 199.316 903.357 
Area Ha. 19.931.600 90.335.700 
Average Munic. Area Sq. Km 500 6.407 
Average Munic. Area Ha. 49.954 640.679 
Population 2010 10.444.526 3.035.122 
GDP in Millions R$ 189.992 57.294 
Per Capta GDP 18.191 18.877 
First Year of Programme 1992 2000 
Number of Municipalities 399 141 
Number of Members 232 85 
Percentage of the Total # Munin. 58% 60% 
Total ICMS-E Transfer 124.123.771,38 55.427.044,98 
Average ICMS-E Transfer 535.016 652.083 
ICMS 2.121.367.594 1.060.503.314 
Average ICMS-E  5.316.711 7.521.300 
Percentage of ICMS-E/ ICMS 5,85% 5,23% 
Ratio ICMS-E/ ICMS by Member 11,61% 13,53% 
Deforestation  in ha. 2007 
 
566.663 
Rate of Deforestation 2001-2007 
 
9,60% 
 
Table 9 
Source: SEMA-MT, IPEA, IBGE, INPE and own calculations.     
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The Spatial Analysis of Forest Burning Incidences and the Conservation Unities  
in Mato Grosso - 2009 
Figure 20 
 
The incidence of forest burning points within Protected Areas’ limits, MT - 2009 
 
Source: SEMA-MT  
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Mato Grosso: Forest Burning – 2008-2009 incidence by hit intensity and Indigenous Land 
Figure 21 
 
Source: SEMA-MT 
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Figure 14. Cattle Slaughter for Meet Production in headcounts. 
 
Figure 22 
Source: IPEA (Brazilian Applied Statistics Research Institute) and IBGE and own calculations. 
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Figure 15. ICMS-E  and Municipalities’ areas in Km2 . 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23 
Source: INPE and SEMA-MT 
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Table10.  ICMS Ecológico: Conservation factors for different management categories of 
protected areas in different Brazilian states. (RING I. e., Assessing Fiscal Transfers for 
Conservation Policies, 2011). 
Table 10 
 
